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The overall aim of this thesis is to clarify relations between the value perspective 
of economics and other value perspectives and its significance for the interpreta-
tion of normative statements and of anomalies found in stated preference (SP) 
surveys. The thesis contains two papers. 
The main objective of the first paper is to analyse and clarify the conceptual 
relations between different value-related terms. It is concluded that economic 
values has a clear meaning whereas other terms, often used to describe, and to 
motivate the preservation of, pastoral landscapes, have unclear normative 
implications. The economic concept of values is, in a sense, complete. Once the 
perspective is adopted it embraces, conceptually, all values of the pastoral 
landscape. With a specific interpretation of e.g. biological values these are 
conceptually included in the economic values. Other interpretations of biological 
values imply, on the other hand, perspectives of values that make economic values 
redundant. 
In the second paper the value perspective of economics is accepted as a normati-
ve assumption for economic analyses. Instead, the theoretical analysis in the paper 
focuses on the possible diverging value perspectives among respondents in SP-
surveys. The aim of the paper is to suggest a framework for interpretation of 
people’s value expressions and to analyse if this framework can explain some of 
the anomalies found in stated preference surveys. It is suggested that people may 
hold values that can be interpreted as opinions about how initial rights should be 
distributed and that such opinions cannot be interpreted as ordinary preferences. If 
a stated preference survey implies a right that is incompatible with the right asser-
ted by a respondent this may very well hinder the formation and expression of pre-
ferences. It is concluded that this incompatibility between implied and asserted 
rights, in many cases, can explain anomalies. This conclusion emphasizes e.g. the 
importance of the choice between WTP- and WTA-measures in stated preference 
surveys. 
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- What is a cynic? 
- A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. 
- And a sentimentalist, my dear Darlington, is a man who sees an absurd value in 
everything, and doesn't know the market price of any single thing. 
 
Oscar Wilde,  
Lady Windermere's Fan, Act 3  
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Introduction 
The overall aim of this thesis is to clarify relations between the value perspective 
of economics and other value perspectives and its significance for the 
interpretation of normative statements and of anomalies found in stated preference 
(SP) surveys. Two kinds of relations are analysed. The first relation, investigated 
in paper I, is on a conceptual level; how can the economic understanding of values 
be related to other perspectives of values? The semi-natural grazing lands in 
Sweden is believed to embrace great values of different kinds and the terms used 
to describe those values serve as examples in the analysis of the relations between 
different value related terms. The second relation, investigated in paper II, has 
implications for some empirical economics, mainly environmental valuation and 
stated preference methods. When eliciting economic measures of value, i.e. 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept, by stated preference methods a certain 
distribution of property rights is implied. Respondents, on the other hand, may 
assert rights that can be either incompatible with, or in concordance with, the 
implied rights. The incompatibility between implied and asserted rights is 
suggested to offer a general explanation to many anomalies that previously have 
been found in stated preference surveys.  
 
The two main questions are developed and analysed in papers I and II respec-
tively. In the continuation of this introducing chapter these questions will be put 
into a broader context of the economics of landscape. First, the pastoral landscape 
will be briefly described, as a background to the analysis of the values in the 
landscape. Thereafter, the economic analyses of the landscape will be described in 
order to put the question of anomalies in stated preference (SP) methods into a 
broader context. Then, the two papers are summarized and finally some 
conclusions, remarks and questions for further research are presented.  
 
 
The pastoral landscape in Sweden 
The analysis of different perspectives of values (Paper I) is exemplified by the 
values of the pastoral landscape, i.e. the semi-natural grazing lands. These low 
productive lands are characterised by traditional management through continuous 
grazing without being exposed to yield improving measures such as fertilizers or 
chemical plant protection measures. This type of management has resulted in a 
shortage of nutrient, which in turn has formed a specific flora. The semi-natural 
grazing land is one of the nature types in Sweden containing the greatest number 
of species. Of the approximately 1 700 species of vascular plants in Sweden, about 
6-700 are represented in the Swedish semi-natural grazing lands (Jordbruksverket, 
1994).. In addition to containing the major part of the biodiversity of the 
agricultural landscape, the pastoral landscape also offers opportunities for 
recreation and aesthetical experiences. It also represents and symbolizes a part of 
the Swedish history e.g. by accommodating cultural historical elements. 
   8
Agricultural structural changes the last century has made most semi-natural 
grazing lands superfluous. As the yield demand of animal increased, the major part 
of traditional pastures have been abandoned or cultivated. The total numbers of 
grazing animals have decreased rapidly the last 50-80 years and high yielding 
arable field are used instead. Today, there are about 450 000 hectares of semi-
natural grazing lands left in Sweden, compared to 2 million hectares in the middle 
of the nineteenth century. The fundamental condition for maintaining the, 
potentially valuable, services of the semi-natural grazing lands is continuous 
grazing. However the increasing shortage of grazing animals is threatening the 
biodiversity of this landscape. To preserve the remaining areas farmers are 
compensated through the CAP, to manage those areas by grazing. Several reports 
have concluded that the compensation are important to preserve the grazing lands 
and that without the compensation, the quantity and probably also the quality of 
the land, will decrease (Jordbruksverket, 2004). But would it be a problem if the 
amount and quality of the pastoral landscape decreased? 
 
Less pastoral landscape – a problem? 
Neither a description of the pastoral landscape nor any forecasts about future 
changes in the landscape can, alone, serve as an argument for preservation. How 
the semi-natural grazing land should be used is a normative statement that, besides 
the positive description, requires a value premise (Ariansen, 1992). A value 
premise can be thought of as a general statement about what is valuable and 
desirable. Since the preservation of the pastoral landscape realizes different 
amenities (grazing possibilities, biodiversity, recreation possibilities, etc.) and 
requires different resources (land, labour, etc.) a value premise should be able to 
take all pros and cons into consideration simultaneously if any conclusion should 
be possible. The state of a landscape may be regarded as a problem if the situation 
diverge from the desired situation, given a specific value premise, (Ariansen, 
1992). Hence, defining anything as a problem is a normative statement that must 
be based on a value premise. Natural resource and environmental economics is a 
subject dealing with e.g. the normative question about how natural resources 
should be used and with the possibility to weigh different pros and cons. Hence, 
economics offers a framework, as well as methods, for answering a question about 
how much of the pastoral landscape that should be preserved and if the current and 
future situation is a problem.  
 
The aim of this thesis is not to empirically estimate any measures of the values 
in the landscape. Instead, the analyses in the thesis can serve as inputs and 
arguments in a broader discussion about if it is i) desirable and ii) possible to 
estimate any economic measures of the values in the pastoral landscape. We will 
come back to these questions in the final section after a brief review of 
environmental economics and the summaries of the appended papers (I & II).  
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Economics of the pastoral landscape 
Economics deals with two kinds of questions concerning the use of scarce 
resources, positive and normative respectively. Positive economics describes and 
analyses how human society works; e.g. the way markets and other institutions 
determine how scarce resources are allocated and how goods and services are 
distributed between consumers. Normative economics, on the other hand, deals 
with question about how resources should be used.  
 
The general idea in normative economics is that all resources should be used so 
that as high values as possible are realised. Values, in the economic perspective, 
are realised when human preferences are satisfied. These values are approximated 
by the economic measures of willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept 
(WTA). The benefits realised by a specific management of a landscape can thus be 
approximated by the WTP or WTA of the users. The costs are defined as 
opportunity costs; the value of the best alternative, non-realized, use of the 
resources. Hence, both benefits and costs are, ultimately, measures of the 
subjective values that people assign to different amenities. The best use of a 
specific resource is the one that maximizes the net value, i.e. the difference 
between benefits and costs, which normally implies that the marginal benefit 
should equal the marginal cost.  
 
Natural resource and environmental economics deals with the use and allocation 
of natural resources, e.g. as inputs (e.g. raw materials) in production, as recipients 
for emissions, as amenities or as suppliers of ecosystem services. The normative 
assumption may be the same as in general economics but possibly complemented 
with sustainability
1 to explicitly take the fairness of the distribution between 
generations into consideration.  
 
The economic analyses of environmental problems may be briefly summarized 
as follows. First, is there at all a problem, i.e. can welfare be improved (i.e. more 
preferences satisfied) by any modification in the use and allocation of resources? 
The answer of that question requires a normative description on how resources 
should be used and a positive description of how resources are used. Then, if there 
is a problem, the next analysis is to suggest possible, ultimately the best, measures. 
Such measures may include institutional changes that improve the function of 
markets as well as different kind of policy measures such as e.g. environmental 
taxes or standards. One base for that analysis is the explanations to why the 
present institutional settings, including markets and policy, have failed to attain an 
efficient use of resources. A recommendation to use policy measures is usually 
justified by the existence of market failures such as the existence of non-rival 
and/or non-exclusive goods.  
                                                           
1 The question of sustainability is not directly analysed in this thesis. However, different opinions about 
sustainability among respondents to SP-surveys may very well be interpreted as opinions, about initial 
distribution of rights, that may influences the answer as well as the interpretation of the answers (paper 
II).   10
It is as a part of the normative analysis of how resources should be used that 
environmental valuation and stated preference methods enter the analysis. For 
many amenities, peoples do express their WTP or WTA on markets so that market 
prices can be used as measures of (marginal) values. For amenities not sold on 
markets there is normally no direct market behaviour that reveals peoples 
preferences. Instead, other methods for eliciting peoples WTP or WTA have been 
developed. In stated preference (SP) methods people are, to make it simple, just 
asked for their WTP or WTA or asked to choose between “baskets of amenities” 
that include a monetary payment or compensation. Since such surveys, when 
applied on environmental goods, are hypothetical the credibility of peoples 
answers have been vastly questioned among economists. The methods have 
however been developed and improved and the supporters maintain that the 
methods are sufficiently credible, especially since the alternative often is to totally 
overlook the value of natural resources and the environment.  
 
Some of the questions that would be elements in a complete economic analysis 
of how the pastoral landscape should be managed and which institutional 
arrangements that would secure the efficient use of resources will be discussed in 
some more detail below. These are questions related to, but not developed in, the 
two appended papers. First, the concept of Pareto efficiency (i.e. the desired 
allocation of resources) and its relation to initial distribution of rights is 
introduced, mainly as a background to the interpretation suggested in paper II. 
This includes a definition of the WTP- and WTA measures and their relation to 
utility. Then, the probable occurrence of market failures, an argument for 
suspecting inefficiency and hence motivation for an economic analysis, is 
discussed. Thereafter follows a section about environmental valuation and stated 
preference methods.  
 
Pareto-efficiency – the desired allocation in economics 
The economic perspective of values can, as in paper I, be classified as a value sub-
jective anthropocentric perspective where individual preferences, approximated by 
WTP or WTA, is the measures of values
2. To compare values between individuals 
the Pareto criterion and the idea of Pareto optimality is usually adopted. A Pareto 
optimal (efficient) situation is present when no redistribution of amenities (or 
production factors) can be made without making someone worse off. A specific 
redistribution is said to be a Pareto-improvement if at least someone gets better off 
and no one gets worse off and to be a potential Pareto-improvement if the winners 
(without becoming losers) potentially could have compensated the losers
3. Any 
use of the Pareto criterion requires a reference point that often is, but doesn’t have 
to be, the initial distribution. Pareto efficiency implies that marginal costs are 
equal to marginal benefits for all amenities. For a non-rival good, e.g. for many of 
the characteristics of the pastoral landscape, the condition becomes: 
                                                           
2 One may, as e.g. Sagoff (1994), maintain an anthropocentric perspective that not regard preferences as 
normatively relevant.  
3 The criterion of potential Pareto-improvement is also known as the Kaldor/Hicks-criterion and is the 
basic criterion for cost-benefit analysis (Randall, 1987).    11 
 
∑ MB = MC   Equation 1    
 
where∑ MB is the vertically summed individual marginal benefits (expressed as 
WTP or WTA) and MC is the marginal cost.  
 
There are an infinite number of Pareto efficient solutions corresponding to 
different initial distributions of rights and different sets of institutions and 
preferences (Randall, 1987). And, both the outcome of markets (Samuels, 1992) 
and of cost-benefit analysis (Schmid, 1995) depends on the initial distribution of 
rights. The question of a desired allocation and distribution of resources hence 
falls apart into two questions where the second is about Pareto-efficiency and the 
first is about how the initial distribution should be defined. Any redistribution, 
potentially Pareto-improvements, may therefore be labeled a secondary 
redistribution (Samuels, 1992).  
 
On a working market the initial distribution, or primary distribution, is set and 
any market transactions will be Pareto-improvements. This does not mean that the 
concept of Pareto-optimality, per se, favour the status quo distribution. But as long 
as a project is analysed as a secondary redistribution the number of changes that 
can be regarded as desirable in relation to Pareto-efficiency are restricted by the 
initial distribution. There may be cases where rights are not defined or when the 
existing structure of legal rights is unclear. This is typically the situation for 
resources that is, or until recently have not been, considered as scarce. The semi-
natural grazing lands have for long times been a by-product from grazing 
motivated by the production of e.g. milk and meat. Even if the consumers of the 
landscape qualities have not had the right to preserved pastures they have had the 
opportunity to enjoy those without any payment, as if they had the right. The 
pastoral landscape has for long time been present for the public to “consume“ and 
there was no scarcity experienced until the areas started to decrease and the threat 
against e.g. biodiversity was discovered and discussed. Even if people have not 
had any legal rights to a specific kind of landscape there may very well be people 
that assert that they have a (moral) right to a preserved landscape. A change in the 
management, which may be analysed as a secondary redistribution, may therefore 
appear as a primary redistribution (i.e. a change in rights).  
 
As this section has shown the economic concept of efficiency, and values, is 
connected to on another normative question: how initial rights should be 
distributed. Even if the later question cannot be normatively judged in an 
economic analysis it is related to, and understandable from, the economic 
perspective. Moreover, it cannot be re-interpreted in terms of efficiency but is 
logically separated from the analysis of (potential) Pareto-improvements. 
Therefore, as suggested in paper II, it must be accepted that people may hold 
values that cannot be interpreted as preferences but should be interpreted as 
opinions about how initial rights should be distributed.  
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WTP and WTA as measures of preferences 
The general condition for Pareto-efficiency was defined in equation 1 at page 11. 
Then, how can “benefits” be measured? So far it has been mentioned that WTP 
and WTA are used as measures that reflect people’s preferences. Theoretically, an 
accurate economic measure of value should reflect changes in peoples utility, 
which is done by e.g. the welfare economic measures compensating variation 
(CV) and equivalent variation (EV) (Ng, 1979). The measures of CV and EV and 
their corresponding WTP- and WTA-measures are briefly introduced in this 
section.  
 
Since the pastoral landscape can be enjoyed without payment (it is a non-
exclusive good) the individual faces no variable cost dependent to the amount of 
the good available. Hence, the situations the individual faces can be illustrated as 
in figure 1. In the initial situation, the amount z0 of landscape is available and the 
welfare maximising individual, with income OB, chooses point E to reach the 
highest possible utility level, U0. Decreasing the amount of landscape to z1 places 
the individual in a situation where point F is chosen to reach the maximal utility 
level U1.  
 
Figure 1.  The welfare effects of a decreased amount of a non-exclusive good z, e.g. 
pastoral landscape. The value can be measured as WTACV-= BC or WTPEV = AB. Notice 
that WTACV > WTPEV. 
 
To evaluate the change, i.e. to measure the change in utility from U0 to U1, 
consider the following possible questions:  
 
At the initial consumption possibility set (OBEz0), how much income can, as a 
maximum, be taken from the individual without diminishing the utility below U1? 
The answer to this question is the WTPEV-measure corresponding to ED = BA in 
figure 1. I.e., with the consumption possibility set OADz0, it is possible to reach 
U1. Hence, the individuals maximal WTP, to avoid the change, is AB.  
 
At the final consumption possibility set (OBFz1), how much income must, as a 
minimum, be transferred to the individual to bring her back to utility level U0? The 
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answer to this question is the WTACV-measure corresponding to FG = BC in 
figure 1. I.e., with the consumption possibility set OCGq1, it is possible to reach 
U0. Hence, the individuals minimal WTA, to tolerate the change, is BC. 
 
The graphic illustration in figure 1 shows the connection between utility and the 
economic measures of value. It also shows that the reference point matters, for a 
certain change in landscape there may, as in the example illustrated, be a diffe-
rence between WTP and WTA. The economic measures of values, CV and EV 
may also be formalised using a mathematical notation as in equation 2 and 
equation 3 respectively (following Johansson, 1993). 
 
First, CV uses the initial utility level as reference level. This means that CV, for 
a decreased amount of e.g. landscape, corresponds to WTA:  
 
) , ( ) , (
0 1 z z q U CV q U = −   Equation 2    
 
where  U(•)  =  the initial utility of the individual (corresponding to U0 in 
figure 1) 
q =  all goods that can be consumed by the income of the 
individual (corresponding to OB in figure 1) 
CV =  the change in income (corresponding to BC in figure 1) 
necessary to keep the individual at the initial utility level  
z
i =  a vector of non-exclusive goods (corresponding to z0 and z1 
in figure 1) 
 
Then, for EV, the final utility level is the reference level. This means that it, for 
a decreased amount of e.g. landscape, corresponds to WTP: 
 
) , ( ) , (
0 1 z z EV q U q U + =   Equation 3    
 
where  U(•)  =  the final utility of the individual (corresponding to U1 in 
figure 1) 
q =  all goods that can be consumed by the income of the 
individual (corresponding to OB in figure 1) 
EV =  the change in income (corresponding to AB in figure 1) 
that, without the change in z
i, brings the individual to the 
final utility level 
z
i =  a vector of non-exclusive goods (corresponding to z0 and z1 
in figure 1) 
 
If the change in the landscape would have been an improvement then WTA 
would have corresponded to the EV-measure and WTP would have corresponded 
to the CV-measure.  
 
Hence, there are two, both theoretically correct, measures of values for a certain 
change in the landscape. Which one should be used, WTP or WTA? The 
appropriate measure depends on property rights so that WTA is the preferred 
measure if the individual has the right to be spared from a deterioration and WTP   14
is preferred if the individual does not have that right (Carson et al., 2001; 
Bromley, 1995; Gregory et al., 1993). However, in practice, the WTA-measure is 
seldom used since the rate of refusals is higher and the estimated WTA are 
regarded as too high (Arrow et al., 1993; Kahneman et al., 1990; Peterson et al., 
1995).  
 
Market failures and the pastoral landscape 
A general conclusion in economics is that working markets are efficient, i.e. they 
lead to Pareto-optimal allocation since peoples’ preferences (or more, accurately, 
their WTP or WTA) are expressed through their market demand. However, a 
general conclusion in environmental economics is that market failures tend to lead 
to inefficient allocation of goods or resources that are non-exclusive and/or non-
rival (Randall, 1987). Since lots of the services provided by the pastoral landscape 
are characterized by non-exclusiveness and/or non-rivalry it is, to answer the 
question raised previously, very likely that a market solution would have provided 
an insufficient amount and quality of semi-natural grazing lands.  
 
Non-exclusiveness can be due to political or cultural circumstances, or basic 
characteristics of the goods or resources (Randall, 1987). The aesthetic qualities of 
a landscape is non-exclusive partly because of its basic characteristics, it is 
impossible (or at least very expensive) to exclude someone from just looking at a 
landscape. The recreation possibilities are, on the other hand, non-exclusive as a 
consequence of the Swedish "allemansrätt", the Right of Common Access (to 
private land), which makes it possible for everyone to enjoy the beauty of a 
landscape. In this case the non-exclusiveness is a result of Swedish cultural 
circumstances. The biodiversity is another example of a non-exclusive component 
of the landscape. It may, partly, be a part of a life supporting system. In this case, 
the non-exclusiveness is explained by the basic characteristics of the service. Non-
exclusiveness means that consumers have incentives to free-ride, which means that 
producers will have problems to get enough paid to compensate their costs of 
production.  
 
Non-rivalry is a physical attribute of the resource; one person can "consume" 
without diminishing other persons' possibilities to consume and derive utility from 
the resource. Therefore it is impossible to make an institutional choice whether, 
for example, the beauty of a pastoral landscape or the biodiversity should be 
treated as a non-rival good or not. To maximise the utility nobody should be 
excluded from using a non-rival good. Hence, even if it were possible and cheap 
to hoard a landscape it would not be an optimal solution even if the private 
producer would maximise his profit. When some of the consumers act as free-
riders the producer will generally not get enough paid to produce/preserve an 
efficient amount of the good or service.  
 
It can now be concluded that economics offers a tool to describe a situation as a 
problem. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that a deterioration of the 
quantity and quality of semi-natural grazing lands is a problem since many of the 
valuable services are characterised by non-exclusiveness and non-rivalry. This   15 
means that the potential values that people ascribe those services will not be taken 
into account by markets. However, a final judgement requires empirical estimates 
of the magnitude of the values people potentially place on the landscape. As 
mentioned before, when no market prices are available, such estimates must be 
done with other valuation methods.  
 
Valuation methods 
Since the introduction of the “new welfare economics” when Hotelling (in 1938) 
suggested that consumer and producer surplus, and not the price, was the relevant 
welfare criterion there has been a need for estimation of demand, and supply, 
functions. The analysis of non-rival goods, presented by Samuelson the same year, 
emphasized, the conclusion that amenities without prices, intangibles, eventually 
could be assigned an estimated valued, namely if there were other methods to 
detect the demand and supply function. This new perspective of economic values 
opened up for valuation methods using other data than the market price for the 
amenity to be valued. Two approaches can be distinguished, namely indirect and 
direct methods. The idea of both of them is that even if there is no demand 
expressed on a market there can very well exist a latent demand curve possible to 
elicit through other methods. Two methods, the contingent valuation method 
(CVM) and the travel cost method, representing direct respectively indirect 
methods, were both first proposed in 1947. Harold Hotelling suggested that the 
value of national parks could be estimated using the expenditures visitors made in 
the form of e.g. travel costs. Ciriacy-Wantrup suggested, in a paper on the 
economics of soil conservation 1947, that people may be asked how much money 
they are willing to pay for an additional amount of a good. Contingent valuation 
was first used in 1963 when Davis conducted a study on the value of recreation 
(Hanemann, 1995). 
 
The indirect methods, also referred to as revealed preference (RP) methods, 
require actual markets where the preferences can be revealed through actual 
behaviour. The central idea is that there are relations between the consumption (or 
the supply) of the commodity that should be evaluated and other goods bought and 
sold on markets. Hence, if there are goods that are either substitutes or 
complements, market data from those markets can be used for evaluation of the 
good. Examples of RP-methods are the travel cost method and the hedonic price 
method. Since these methods are not capable of eliciting any non-use values they 
are assumed to be less useful for valuing landscapes where, for example, the 
function for preservation of biodiversity can be ascribed a, partially, non-use 
motivated value.  
 
Since many of the values associated with preservation of pastoral landscapes are 
pure non-use motivated values, e.g. existence motivated values, the revealed 
preference methods are of less use. Therefore, there is a need for other methods, 
capable of eliciting also non-use motivated values such as direct methods as stated 
preference (SP) methods or experiments. Among the SP methods can contingent 
valuation, contingent ranking, conjoint analysis and choice experiments 
(Adamowicz, 1995; Boxall et al., 1996). The distinctions between the different SP   16
methods are often unclear but the thesis deals with some general problems with 
SP-methods, which, here, makes any distinctions unnecessary.  
 
The main advantage with stated preference methods, such as CVM, is the possi-
bilities to elicit non-use motivated values (Carson et al., 2001). On the other hand, 
the main problem with CVM, as an example of SP methods, has even since the 
beginning been the question whether hypothetical questions can generate reliable 
estimates of true preferences. Among the potential problems are insensitivity to 
scope, anchoring effects, sequence and context effects and strategic behaviour. To 
handle these and other problems there has been an ongoing discussion on the 
incentive compatibility of different elicitation format. One way of describing the 
problems in SP-surveys is though that they can be explained by biases that are 
results of imperfect elicitation methods. Another interpretation is that SP-surveys 
have pointed out different anomalies, systematic deviations between human 
behaviour and economic theory (Sugden, 2005). In that perspective, it may not be 
imperfect valuation methods that are the problem, but rather the assumptions in 
economic theory. This is where paper II starts; can the anomalies be generally 
explained by assuming that people may hold and express opinions about how 
initial rights should be distributed? 
 
 
Summaries of appended papers 
In previous section the economics of landscape was briefly introduced. It should 
be clear that there are lots of questions regarding the values of the semi-natural 
grazing lands that are not analysed in this thesis. The aim of the previous section 
was to put the questions that are analysed in the appended papers (I & II) into a 
broader context. In this section the appended papers are summarized.  
 
Summary of paper I 
In paper I the value perspective of welfare economics is put into a broader value 
theoretical perspective and related to some other (non-economic) value-related 
terms. The main objective of the paper is to place different value related terms into 
a common value theoretical framework, and thereby improve the possibility to 
understand the relations between the terms.  
 
One rationale for the purpose is the extensive use of different value-related 
terms in the debate regarding the changes of the agricultural landscape. It is e.g. 
stressed that these changes threat biological, cultural historical, recreational, 
economic and aesthetical values attached to the landscape. However, as an 
analysis in the paper shows, the meanings of the value-related terms are often 
unclear. This means that the relations between the terms also are unclear and that 
comparisons between different values becomes more or less impossible which, in 
the end, may result in less suitable policy measures.  
   17 
The analysis of the terms shows that clear connection to theory of values often is 
missing. It is suggested that many value-related terms do not have a clear 
normative meaning and that such terms would be clearer if the word “value” 
would be omitted. I.e. instead of “biological values” terms as, e.g., “biological 
functions” and “biological objects” (which both may have value) will improve the 
understanding.  
 
The term “economic value” has however, at least for an economist, a clear and 
normative meaning. The term indicates a clear anthropocentric value subjectivistic 
perspective and it is possible to interpret other value related terms within that 
perspective. E.g., biological functions may have an economic value. To emphasize 
that other values not should be added to the economic value the term Economic 
Measure of Total Value (EMTV) is suggested.  
 
The analysis shows that it is important to be clear on the definition of values. An 
economic analysis implies a specific value perspective that, in principle, comprises 
“biological values” if that term refers to “biological objects” of “biological 
functions”. In that case no biological values should be added to the economic 
value. Of course, some values may, in practice, be hard or impossible to measure. 
In that sense it can be said that “the (economic) value of some biological objects 
should be added to an incomplete estimation of an economic value”.  
 
The economic value does not, on the other hand, comprise "biological values” if 
that term refers to “intrinsic biological values”. Neither in that case can the 
“biological values” be added to the economic value since the values, interpreted in 
this way, are logically incommensurable.  
 
Summary of paper II 
In paper II the value perspective of welfare economics is accepted as a normative 
assumption for economic analyses. Instead, the theoretical analysis in the paper 
focuses on the possible diverging value perspectives among respondents in SP-
surveys. More generally, the main aim of the paper is to suggest a framework for 
interpretation of people’s value expressions and to analyse if this framework can 
explain some of the “anomalies” found in stated preference surveys (e.g. the 
occurrence of lexicographic preferences, protests, preference reversals and 
respondents opposing the economic interpretation of WTP- or WTA-answers).  
 
The rationales for the purpose are two. The first is to try to find a common 
explanation and understanding for different anomalies, i.e. value-expressions that 
do not fit into economic theory, that so forth have been explained by diverging ad 
hoc explanations. The second rational is the conclusion from paper I that, from the 
economic perspective, many different value perspectives can be interpreted as 
opinions about the initial distribution of rights.  
 
The framework is based on three assumptions. First, that people may have 
opinions about how initial rights should be distributed. Second, that acceptance of 
property rights is a necessary precondition for preference formation. And, third,   18
that property rights may be accepted only if they i) cannot be affected or ii) in case 
they can be affected if they are regarded as morally legitimate.  
 
From these assumptions it is concluded that SP-surveys place people in a 
situation where they may perceive that property rights can be affected and where 
they may find the implied rights (morally) illegitimate. Hence, the implied rights 
may not be accepted and consequently the respondent may not have formed any 
preferences and can therefore not express any (relevant) WTP or WTA. However, 
since she may have opinions about how the rights should be distributed she may 
take the opportunity to express this value. In the paper it is stressed that such value 
expressions should be interpreted as non-preferential value expressions and that 
such an interpretation can serve as a general explanation to different anomalies.  
 
Hence, if respondents should express preferences (or rather WTP/WTA 
measures) in SP-surveys it is crucial that they, at least conditionally, accept the 
rights implied by the WTP- or WTA-question respectively. E.g. a WTP-question 
implies that the respondent does not have the right. If the respondent confronted 
with such a question, asserts that she has, or should have, the right, she may report 
this opinion instead of any WTP-measure based on preferences. This means that 
concordance between (by the question) implied rights and (by the respondent) 
asserted rights is necessary for the formation and expression of preferences. In 
case of incompatibility no preferences may be formed. This can explain previous 
anomalies, such as refuses to answer, protests or “lexicographic preferences”.  
 
Possible asserted rights are categorized into five classes and the possible reac-
tions to SP-surveys are discussed in relation to WTP- and WTA-questions. The re-
sult of the analysis is, as summarised in table 1, that perfect concordance will 
occur only in two or three out of ten cases of combinations between implied and 
asserted rights.  
 
Table 1.  Relations between asserted and implied rights. INC (incompatibility) means that 
respondents may have problems to form preferences and CON (concordance) means that 
preferences may be formed.  
  Respondent asserts that 
she has the right 
Respondent asserts that 
other party has the right 
  Privately Collectively Privately Collectively 
Respondent 
asserts that “third 
party” has private 
or collective right 
WTP-
quest. 
(IWTP) 
INC 
(IIWTP) 
INC 
(IIIWTP) 
CON 
(IVWTP) 
INC 
(VWTP) 
INC 
WTA-
quest. 
(IWTA) 
CON 
(IIWTA) 
INC 
(IIIWTA)
INC / 
CON 
(IVWTA) 
INC 
(IVWTA) 
INC 
 
This result offers an argument against the recommendation to always use the 
WTP-format. Moreover, for amenities where the respondent asserts collective 
rights, both the WTP- and the WTA-question imply rights that may be 
incompatible with the asserted rights. This means that, for many environmental   19 
goods, neither the WTP- nor the WTA-question may imply rights that can be 
accepted by the respondents. If a right means that the owner explicitly must agree 
on selling, and if people assert that future generations, that cannot agree explicitly, 
have rights, then respondents may refuse to get involved in any (even 
hypothetical) exchanges at all.  
 
Conclusions, comments and future research 
Finally, are there any general conclusions from the two papers? Two questions, 
which could have been raised by e.g. a policy maker, were introduced above: is 
the elicitation of economic values i) desirable and ii) possible. Of course there is 
no final answers to such questions but the analyses of this thesis may serve as 
input into an ongoing discussion about these and related questions.  
 
Conclusions about the concept of values 
Whether the elicitation of economic measures of values is desirable depends, 
ultimately, on if one agrees on the normative assumptions of economics. The 
economic concept of values is, in a sense, complete. Conceptually it embraces, 
once the perspective is adopted, all values so that a normative weighing, where all 
effects of a change in the pastoral landscape are considered, can be made. In 
practice, empirically, there may still be problems to elicit the economic measure of 
value, due to methodological shortcomings. On a conceptual level this is however 
not an argument against the desirability of eliciting economic measures of values, 
at least as long as methods can be improved to reduce the problems. Then, if the 
economic concept of values is complete, can other perspectives of values, other 
value premises than the economic, be regarded as redundant? The answer is no.  
 
First, the choice of value perspective is an important normative question and 
there are no objective arguments for why the economic perspective is better, or 
worse, than any other perspective of values. In all analyses some assumptions have 
to be done and all normative analyses must be based on a value criteria, i.e. a nor-
mative assumption about what constitutes values. It is therefore legitimate to adopt 
an economic perspective by making a normative assumption that preferences 
should count. It is however important to be aware of that it is normative 
assumptions that is the base for the analysis and to be aware of which perspective 
of values one thereby have adopted. Paper I presents a value theoretical 
framework that can be used to clarify which normative assumptions the choice 
implies and other value-related terms can be understood from this perspective. It is 
important to be clear about when other “values” are included in the economic 
value and when they are not. If one doesn’t agree on the normative assumptions in 
economics, it doesn’t matter that the concept is complete; it may simply be 
rejected as irrelevant.  
 
Second, since individuals may defend other perspectives of values, the result of 
empirical economic analyses may depend on values that logically cannot be 
interpreted as preferences. The conclusion in paper II is that incompatibility   20
between implied and asserted rights can explain a lot of the anomalies found in 
SP-studies. It is therefore, even if the economic perspective of values is preferred 
and adopted, important to have some understanding of non-economic perspectives 
of values.  
 
Conclusions about empirical elicitation of values 
Whether it is possible to elicit (correct) economic measures of values is a question 
that has been discussed in relation to SP-methods as long as the methods have 
been used. This thesis does add some arguments to that discussion.  
 
The conclusion from paper II is that people, if they don’t accept the implied 
rights, may chose to express opinions about the initial rights. Hence, if the implied 
rights deviate from legal rights or from what people believe is morally legitimate it 
may be difficult to make people form and express preferences. One way of 
avoiding this is to emphasize that the implied rights are in force and cannot be 
affected. This may however be difficult as long as the scenario is hypothetical. 
Another way may be to offer an explicit possibility to express opinions about 
rights which means that respondent do not have to express these views when 
answering the WTP/WTA-question. When having had the possibility to express 
the opinion about the distribution of rights, it may be easier to accept the implied 
rights and hence to (at least conditionally) form and express preferences related to 
these rights. However, as concluded in paper II, it may just as well be that such an 
explicit question on opinions about initial distribution of rights could make more 
respondents more reluctant to express preferences. How people actually would 
react is an empirical question, and hence a question for further research. 
 
From paper II it can be concluded that there is a risk for incompatibility between 
implied and asserted rights in a majority of the analysed cases. For amenities with 
collective rights, as asserted by the respondent, both the WTP- and the WTA-
question imply rights that may be incompatible with the asserted rights. This 
means that, for many environmental goods, neither the WTP- nor the WTA-
question may imply rights that can be accepted by the respondents. If it is not 
possible to convince people about that implied rights are legitimate, or not 
possible to affect, the conclusion is that it may be impossible to elicit a correct 
measure of economic values for amenities where respondents assert that e.g. future 
generations have rights.  
 
Another conclusion, based on the analysis in paper I, is that opinions about the 
initial distribution of rights may be regarded as relevant information in itself. It 
may be regarded as an at least as important input in the political process as 
information about preferences. It should be noted, as concluded in paper II, that 
also individuals actually stating a WTP or WTA may assert a distribution of rights 
opposite to the implied but may choose to conditionally answer the WTP/WTA-
question. Supplementing the surveys with an explicit possibility to express opi-
nions about the primary distribution question means that important information 
about the values people hold can complement the information about preferences. 
In that sense, the result of a survey may help, e.g. politicians, also to answer the   21 
question whether the elicitation of economic measures of values is desirable or 
not.  
 
Comments and further questions  
The aim of paper II was to suggest a framework that could offer a general 
explanation to different anomalies. The conclusion was that the suggested 
assumptions did offer a framework from which at least the anomalies discussed in 
paper II could be explained. Questions for further research are if the framework 
can explain other anomalies as well and whether some empirical testing can be 
made to “verify” the framework suggested in paper II.  
 
The WTP/WTA-disparity – some comments 
Another anomaly, that has not been discussed and analysed here, is the disparity 
between WTP and WTA. If that anomaly also can be interpreted as an outcome of 
the incompatibility between implied and asserted rights is a question for further 
research. Some comments will, however, be made. Why is minimum willingness 
to accept (WTA) to forgo an amenity often found to drastically exceed maximum 
willingness to pay (WTP) to receive the same amenity? A number SP studies have 
shown disparities between elicited WTP and WTA for the same goods (Horowitz 
& McConnell, 2002). A disparity can, generally, be explained as i) an effect of 
biases in the elicitation mechanism, ii) as an effect of the structure of the 
underlying preferences or iii) as a combination of those effects. The discussion 
concerning the structure of the underlying preferences has lately been centred on if 
the substitution effect or the endowment effect
4 will explain the disparity 
(Hanemann, 1991; Morrison, 1997; Shogren & Hayes, 1997)Different possible 
explanations to the disparity have been suggested. Randall and Stoll have argued 
that the income effect is the only possible explanation to a disparity but that the 
income effect is supposed to be small or zero for all goods (Randall & Stoll, 
1980). Hence, no significant WTP/WTA disparity should be expected due to the 
income effect. However, Hanemann has argued that even a very small income 
effect combined with a substitution effect, results in a significant, possibly 
infinite, difference between WTP and WTA (Hanemann, 1991). This theoretical 
result has been supported by experimental results (Shogren et al., 1994) and the 
substitution effect is today a widely accepted explanation to why WTA often is 
found to significantly exceed WTP. Others have been arguing that a disparity is to 
be expected due to an endowment effect (Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990). 
Also other explanations have been suggested, e.g. imprecise preferences 
(Dubourg et al., 1994; Morrison, 1998), and learning effects (Morrison, 1998). 
Since the use of WTP or WTA implies different rights it is possible that the 
framework suggested in paper II can be used to, at least partly, explain even the 
WTP/WTA disparity.  
 
 
                                                           
4   The endowment effect is an effect of asymmetric evaluations of gains and losses, i.e. the direction of 
proposed trading matters (Knetsch, 1989).    22
The discovered preference hypothesis – some comments 
In paper II it is suggested that acceptance of property rights is a necessary 
precondition for preferences formation. This assumption of course contradicts the 
assumption of complete preferences. The occurrence of anomalies is however a 
reason for questioning that assumption. One way is to, as made in paper II, assume 
that preferences are potentially complete. Another interpretation is discussed by 
e.g. Braga & Stramer (2005). They suggest that preferences are complete but that 
it takes some training, for a person herself, to discover them. This is the 
Discovered Preference Hypothesis (DPH). According to DPH, as interpreted by 
Braga & Stramer, people are equipped with stable and context free underlying 
preferences with standard characteristics. Then the anomalies becomes errors 
relative to the underlying preferences, i.e. it is not the preferences that does not fit 
into the standard theory but rather that people doesn’t have the ability to express 
their true preferences until they have discovered them. From that assumption, 
Braga & Stramer suggest that the anomalies, rather than contradicting standard 
theory, are errors in SP-methods that can disappear if people become more 
experienced in relevant decision environments. It is stressed that some of the 
anomalies decay if decisions are repeated and if real incentives are offered. Can 
this explanation, as the ad hoc explanations discussed in paper II, be incorporated 
to the framework suggested in paper II? This is a question for further research but 
a preliminary answer is that it can be partly incorporated.  
 
Real incentives mean that property rights are less unclear and not questionable. 
Therefore, when real incentives are introduced there are, according to the analysis 
in paper II, fewer arguments for expressing opinions about initial rights.  
 
Hence, there are two competing hypotheses about how it comes that people 
seems to not know their own preferences, preference construction and DPH. The 
framework suggested here is closest to the idea of constructed preferences but it 
may, slightly reinterpreted, be compatible with the DPH. On one point is the 
analysis in paper II, however, incompatible with the DPH. In paper II it is assumed 
that acceptance of property rights is a necessary precondition for preference 
formation. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that preferences are not complete, 
which is en explicit assumption under the DPH. Whether the preferences are 
“discovered” or “formed” is partly a semantic question. Preliminary, the 
framework suggested in paper II might be compatible with DPH if assumption 2 is 
reformulated:  
 
Assumption 2b. Acceptance of property rights is a necessary precondition for 
discovering preferences.  
 
Whether this preliminary conclusion holds is a question for further research.  
 
Empirical testing 
Some of the results of this thesis are about different ways of interpreting certain 
observations. It is, for example, suggested that interpreting certain answers as 
opinions about initial rights is a better interpretation than to interpret them as   23 
lexicographic preferences. One may ask people directly about which interpretation 
that is closest to their intentions but since it is interpretations it may be more 
interesting how they fit into a theoretical framework; it is not primarily an 
empirical question.  
 
Nevertheless, some empirical research can be done. It is possible to test if an 
explicit question about the initial rights affects as well the rate of answer as the 
WTP- or WTA-measures. It is also possible to perform a meta-study where it is 
investigated how the “grade of reasonability” of the implied rights have affected 
the results of previous studies. This is, however, questions for future research.  
 
 
References  
Adamowicz, Vic. 1995. Alternative Valuation Techniques: A Comparison and Movement 
to a Synthesis. In: Willis, K. G. and Corkindale, J. T. (eds.) Environmental valuation: 
New perspectives. CAB International, Wallingford, Oxon, U.K., pp 144-59. 
Ariansen, Per. 1992. Miljöfilosofi. Nya Doxa, Nora. 1-236. 
Arrow, K., Solow, R., Leamer, E., Radner, R. & Schuman, H. 1993. Report of the NOAA 
panel on Contingent Valuation. Federal Register Vol. 58, No. 10, 4601-4614. 
Boxall, P., Adamowicz, W., Swait, J., Williams, M. & Louviere, J. 1996. A comparison of 
stated preference methods for environmental valuation. Ecological Economics 18 (3), 
243-53. 
Braga, Jacinto & Starmer, Chris. 2005. Preference Anomalies, Preference Elicitation and 
the Discovered Preference Hypothesis. Environmental and Resource Economics 32 (1), 
55-89. 
Bromley, Daniel W. 1995. Property Rights and Natural Resource Damage Assessments. 
Ecological Economics 14 (2), 129-35. 
Carson, Richard T., Flores, Nicholas E. & Meade, Norman F. 2001. Contingent Valuation: 
Controversies and Evidence. Environmental and Resource Economics 19, 173-210. 
Dubourg, W. R., Jones-Lee, M. W. & Loomes, Graham. 1994. Imprecise Preferences and 
the WTP-WTA Disparity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 9 (2), 115-33. 
Gregory, Robin, Lichtenstein, Sarah & Slovic, Paul. 1993. Valuing Environmental 
Resources: A Constructive Approach. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7 (2), 177-97. 
Hanemann, Michael. 1991. Willingness To Pay and Willingness To Accept: How Much 
Can They Differ? American Economic Review 81, 635-47. 
Hanemann, W. Michael. 1995. Contingent Valuation and Economics. In: Willis, K. G. and 
Corkindale, J. T. (eds.) Environmental valuation: New perspectives. CAB International, 
Wallingford, Oxon, U.K., pp 79-117. 
Horowitz, John K. & McConnell, Kenneth E. 2002. A Review of WTA/WTP Studies. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44 (3), 426-47. 
Johansson, Per-Olov. 1993. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Change. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 1-232. 
Jordbruksverket. 1994. Naturbetesmarker. Biologisk mångfald och variation i 
odlingslandskapet , 1-25. 
Jordbruksverket. 2004. Tre nya miljöersättningar. Hur blev det? Rapport från projekt CAP:s 
miljöeffekter. Rapport 2004:5, 1-76. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L. & Thaler, Richard H. 1990. Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98 (6), 1325-
48. 
Knetsch, Jack L. 1989. The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference 
Curves. American Economic Review 79 (5), 1277-84.   24
Morrison, Gwendolyn C. 1997. Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and 
Willingness to Accept: Comment. American Economic Review 87 (1), 236-40. 
Morrison, Gwendolyn C. 1998. Understanding the Disparity between WTP and WTA: 
Endowment Effect, Substitutability, or Imprecise Preferences? Economics Letters 59 (2), 
189-94. 
Ng, Yew-Kwang. 1979. Welfare Economics. Introduction and Devolopment of Basic 
Concepts. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London.  
Peterson, George L., Brown, Thomas C., McCollum, Daniel W., Bell, Paul A., Birjulin, 
Andrej A., and Clarke, Andrea. 1995. Moral responsibility effects in valuation of WTA 
for public and private goods by the method of paired comparison. Paper at the Sixth 
Annual Conference of the EAAE, Umeå 1995. 
Randall, Alan. 1987. Resource Economics. An Economic Approach to Natural Resource 
and Environmental Policy. John Wiley & Son, New York. 1-434. 
Randall, Alan & Stoll, John R. 1980. Consumer's Surplus in Commodity Space. American 
Economic Review 70 (3), 449-55. 
Sagoff, Mark. 1994. Should Preferences Count? Land Economics 70 (2), 127-44. 
Samuels, W. 1992. Welfare economics, power and property. In: Essays on the economic 
role of government.  
Schmid, A. Allan. 1995. The Environment and Property Rights Issues. In: Bromley, Daniel 
W. (eds.) Handbook of Environmental Economics.  
Shogren, Jason F. & Hayes, Dermot J. 1997. Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay 
and Willingness to Accept: Reply. American Economic Review 87 (1), 241-4. 
Shogren, Jason F., Shin, Seung Y., Hayes, Dermot J. & Kliebenstein, James B. 1994. 
Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept. American 
Economic Review 84 (1), 255-70. 
Sugden, Robert. 2005. Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques: A Framework for a 
Discussion of Coping Strategies. Environmental and Resource Economics 32 (1), 1-12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   25 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is a result of a process that started… well, when did it start? It wouldn’t 
at all have been possible if it hadn’t been for Big Bang, for the evolution of 
mammals and human beings, for King Gustavus Adolphus who founded 
Gothenburg back in 1621 (so that my parent could meet there), for Adam Smith 
(the moral philosopher) founding economics, for Frank Petrini introducing natural 
resource and environmental economics at the department of Economics, etc. etc. I 
would like to thank all persons that have been involved in or have had any 
influence on this prolonged process... Even if many more necessary preconditions 
and persons could be mentioned I will restrict myself to mention some of them 
that, beside myself, have had a more direct influence.  
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor professor Ing-Marie Gren for more or 
less forcing me to finally complete something. Ing-Marie’s ability to make my 
writing more focused and stringent, her financial support and her patience have 
been crucial for the success with this thesis. Thank you, Ing-Marie! 
 
Knut Per Hasund once employed me as a doctoral candidate and Erik Fahlbeck 
contributed with important additional funding. I would like to thank both of you 
for financial, intellectual and mental support during the work with this thesis.  
 
The division of Natural Resource and Environmental Economics has since many 
years been an important forum for critical and interesting discussions about 
economics. Many colleagues have taken part in such discussions during the years. 
I would like to thank Svante Axelsson for introducing me to the subject of Natural 
Resource and Environmental Economics and Thomas Hahn for long discussions 
about what economics is and is not. Such discussions have inspired my critical 
thinking about economics, and my critical thinking regarding critical thinking 
about economics. A lot of students who, by asking quite clever “stupid questions”, 
have forced and inspired me to try to understand how non-economists think and 
how these thoughts can be interpreted and explained from an economic 
perspective.  
 
Many colleagues at the Department of Economics, too many to mention anyone, 
have commented drafts during the work with this thesis and made the everyday 
life at the department enjoyable and thereby both inspired and delayed me. Thanks 
to all of you. Of course I am solely responsible for errors, mistakes and omissions 
remaining. 
 
For the financial support of my work I’m indebted to the faculty of Natural 
Resources and Agricultural Sciences, for funding through the projects “the 
Pastoral Landscape” and “Krusenberg”, and to the department of Economics.  
   26
My family, Helene, Ylva and Vidar, is in all senses invaluable. I would refuse to 
state any WTP- or WTA- amounts and I would probably fail if I tried to explain 
why in terms of asserted rights… You are, simply the meaning of my life. Thanks 
to all of you for just being! Thanks, Helene, for convincing me that I have 
something to contribute with. I’m also grateful for all help with “my part” of the 
work at home, for your encouragement and for all other help that have made this 
easier, or even possible. I wish I could make your work easier and I guess that a 
precise number, in SEK, on the value of the pastoral landscape would have 
helped… but, believe me, the results and conclusions of this thesis are more 
important than any figures! References
† 
Anderberg, T. 1994. Den mänskliga naturen. En essä om miljö och moral. Nordstedts, 
Värnamo, 302pp.  
Andrew, R. N. L. and Waites, M. J. 1978. Evironmental Values in Public Decisions: A 
Research Agenda. Ann Arbor: School of Natural Resources, University of Michigan.  
Ariansen, P. 1993. Miljöfilosofi. Nya Doxa, Nora, 231pp. 
Blamey, R., Common, M. and Quiggin, J. 1995. Respondents to Contingent Valuation 
Surveys: Consumers or Citizens. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 39 
No 3, 263-88. 
Brown, T. C. 1984. The Concept of Value in Resource Allocation. Land Economics Vol 60, 
No. 3, August 1984, 231-46. 
Gren, I-M. Folke, C. Turner, K. and Bateman, I. 1994. Primary and Secondary Values of 
Wetland Ecosystems. Environmental and Resource Economics 4, 55-74. 
Hanemann, W. M. 1994. Willingness-to-pay and Willingness-to-accept: How Much Can 
They Differ?. American Economic Review 81, 635-47. 
Harrison. G. 1993. General Reactions to the NOAA-report. CVM-network, 1993. 
Hasund, K. P. 1991. Jordbruket i miljöräkenskaperna- en idédiskussion. In: SOU 1991:38 
Bilaga 3. Allmänna förlaget, Stockholm. 
Jakobsson, K. M. and Dragun, A. K. 1996. Contingent Valuation and Endangered Species. 
Methodological Issues and Application. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 243pp. 
Jones, M. 1993. Landscape as a resource and the problem of landscape values. In: Rusten, 
C. and Wøien, H. (eds.) The Politics of Environmental Conservation. Proceedings from a 
Workshop in Trondheim March 26, 1993. Report no. 6/93, The University of Trondheim, 
Centre for Environment and Development (SMU), 19-33. 
Jordbruksverket. 1994. Naturbetesmarker. Biologisk mångfald och variation i odlingsland-
skapet. 25pp. 
Jordbruksverket. 1995. Ängar. Biologisk mångfald och variation i odlingslandskapet. 15pp. 
Kriström, B. 1995. Practical Problems in Contingent Valuation. Sveriges lantbruksuniver-
sitet, institutionen för skogsekonomi, Rapport 111. Umeå.  
Krutilla, J. V. 1967. Conservation Reconsidered. American Economic Review 57 (4), 777-
86. 
Lockwood, M. 1997. Integrated value theory for natural areas. Ecological Economics 20, 
83-93. 
Malinvaud, E. 1972. Lectures on Microeconomic Theory. North Holland, Amsterdam.  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 1993. Report of the NOAA Panel on 
Contingent Valuation. Federal Register, v.S8, no.10, January 11 1993, 4602-4614. 
O’Neill, J. 1992. The varieties of intrinsic value. The Monist 75, 119-33. 
Pearce, D. W. Turner, R. K. 1990. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment. 
Harvester Weatsheaf, Exeter, 359pp. 
Sagoff, M. 1988. The economy of the earth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
262pp.  
Sagoff, M. 1994. Should Preferences Count? Land-Economics 70(2) May 1994, 127-44. 
Spash, C. L. and Hanley, N. 1995. Preferences, information and biodiversity preservation. 
Ecological Economics 12, 191-208. 
Vadnjal, D. and O'Connor, M. 1994. What is the Value of Rangitoto Island? Environmental 
Values 3(1994), 369-80.  
 
                                                           
† This is an abbreviation of the originally published reference list. Only the references referred to in the 
reprinted chapter have been included.   1 
Perceptions of Rights and 
Environmental Valuation 
 
Incompatible Opinions About Rights as 
Explanation to Anomalies in SP-surveys 
 
Fredrik Holstein
* 
 
The occurrence of anomalies, value-expressions that do not fit into economic theory, has 
give rise to different explanations: the occurrence of lexicographic preferences, protests, 
preference reversals and respondents opposing the economic interpretation of willingness to 
pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) answers. In this paper it is suggested that such 
value-expressions can be interpreted as opinions about how initial rights should be 
interpreted. It is suggested that incompatibility between such opinions and the rights 
implied by a questionnaire may explain anomalies of the kind mentioned above. The model 
suggested here predicts that the relation between rights implied by the questionnaire and 
rights asserted by the respondent can be crucial for the result of stated preference surveys 
and that a majority of all possible combinations of implied and asserted rights entail rational 
motives for respondents not to express WTP/WTA as expected in economic theory.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The extensive use of contingent valuation method (CVM) and other stated 
preference (SP) methods for e.g. environmental valuation has illustrated 
incompleteness of the economic understanding of people’s value-expressions 
(Vatn, 2004). The way people react and answers to SP-surveys cannot always be 
explained as arising from preferences of the kind normally assumed in economic 
theory. “Inexplicable” reactions and answers have given rise to different 
exceptions from standard assumptions such as the occurrence of lexicographic 
preferences, modified lexicographic preferences (MLP), protests, preference 
reversals and respondents opposing the economic interpretation of their 
willingness to pay (WTP) and/or willingness to accept (WTA) answers. 
Disregarding such answers entails incompleteness when valuing e.g. 
environmental changes whereas including them raises interpretational problems 
and may cause incompatibility between unrelated values. The main aim of this 
paper is to suggest a framework for interpretation of people’s value expressions 
and to analyse if this framework can explain some of the “anomalies”.  
 
The central assumption in this paper is that people’s value-expressions can be 
interpreted as belonging to one of two categories. Either they can be interpreted as 
preferences of the kind normally assumed in economic theory. Or, they can be 
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interpreted as opinions about how initial rights should be distributed. The later 
should, with this distinction, be interpreted as non-preferential value-expressions. 
If opinions about how rights should be distributed are contrary to the rights 
implied by e.g. a WTP-question in SP-surveys it is assumed that people have good 
reasons for not expressing preferences for the suggested trade-off but instead 
express their divergent opinion about how the initial rights should be distributed. 
Hence, protests and other “anomalies” may be understood as an outcome of the 
incompatibility between (by the respondent) asserted rights and (by the WTP- or 
WTA-question) implied rights. Ten possible combinations of asserted and implied 
rights are identified. Only in two cases there is an obvious concordance whereas in 
all other cases there is a potential incompatibility that may explain the occurrence 
of anomalies in e.g. SP-surveys.  
 
As noted by Curtis (2001), even if the understanding of respondents’ motives 
(behind e.g. “anomaly-answers”) has improved it is hard, or impossible, to fully 
understand the individuals’ motives. However, to put it a bit far-fetched, the aim 
here is not to, in a psychological sense, understand the motives of the individuals. 
Instead, the purpose of the paper is limited to suggest a framework from which 
different motives can be interpreted.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the occurrence of what, perhaps a 
bit superficial, is called “anomalies”
1 and previous explanations to these are 
reviewed. Then, in section 3, an alternative explanation is suggested and used to 
predict reasonable reactions to SP-questions. Thereafter, in section 4, some 
previous results are reinterpreted in the light of the suggested perspective of 
people’s value-expressions. Finally, the paper is summarised and further questions 
are raised in section 5.  
 
 
2. “Anomalies” - occurrence and previous 
explanations 
From an economic perspective empirical results, such as answers (or non-answers) 
to SP-surveys, can be regarded as “anomalies” if they cannot be explained from 
standard economic assumptions of the characteristics of “normal preferences”
2 
                                                           
1 The reactions and answers are anomalies if regarded from a perspective where people are assumed to 
be utility maximizers with “normal” preferences. From other perspectives such reactions or answers 
may be anything but anomalies.  
2 In economics it is usually assumed that preferences, in order to be able to order all possible 
consumption set, fulfil the assumptions of completeness (all consumption bundles can be compared), 
reflexiveness (every consumption bundle is at least as good as itself), transitivity (if x is preferred to y 
and y is preferred to z then x is preferred to z) and non-satiation (guarantees that the indifference set is 
never “wider” than a single point). In order to guarantee solutions to optimization problems it is 
normally also assumed that preferences are continuous (implying that a decrease in the consumption of 
one good always can be compensated by an increase of another good making the consumer indifferent) 
and, to ensure a global optimum, strictly convex (Varian, 1992; Gravelle & Rees, 1992). It is sometimes 
also stressed that preferences are also assumed to be stable, see e.g. Vatn (2004). I will not regard the   3 
(Sugden, 2005). An empirical result can also be thought of as an anomaly if 
additional, and implausible, assumptions are needed to explain the result 
(Kahneman et al., 1991). An anomaly has a causal explanation but the explanation 
is excluded or misinterpreted by that theory, to which the result appear as an 
anomaly (Sugden, 2005). Among the anomalies observed in relation to SP-studies 
are the WTP/WTA-disparity, the scale intensity, hypothetical bias, preference 
reversals, the influence of irrelevant cues and the endowment effect (Sugden, 
2005; Hanley & Shogren, 2005; Braga & Starmer, 2005).  
 
This paper will focus on some of these anomalies, namely that people that are 
assumed to be rational equipped with “normal preferences”, instead of reporting 
their WTP or WTA quite frequently 
1.  protest instead of reporting their true WTP/WTA,  
2.  refuse to make trade-offs,  
3.  report inconsistent rankings or  
4.  oppose an economic interpretation of their WTP/WTA answers.  
 
The examples reviewed in section 2.1 below, shows that these kinds of reactions 
are not unusual in SP-surveys. As reviewed in section 2.2, these anomalies have 
given rise to a number of different and divergent explanations that call for a more 
general explanation. In section 3 it will be assumed that people may hold non-
preferential opinions about how rights should be distributed and it will be shown 
that this can complement the previous explanations to the anomalies.  
 
2.1  “Anomalies” - previous occurrence 
First, it is a common problem in SP-surveys that respondents refuse to answer 
either the whole questionnaire or the WTP/WTA-question . It is also common that 
people refuse to state any WTP/WTA for reasons other than that they really prefer 
the scenario that includes payment or compensation (Jorgensen et al., 1999; 
Strazzera, 2003). Even though a refuse to pay may be a correct reflection of 
people being indifferent (Kriström, 1997; Strazzera, 2003) it may also be, which is 
problematic, that they do not correctly reflect the “true economic value” 
(Jorgensen et al., 1999). The general recommendation is to try to minimize the 
number of protests and to delete the identified protests from the data (Freeman, III, 
2003, pp 165-166) and the debate have focused on which answers that should be 
censored (Jorgensen et al., 1999) and how this may lead to a sample selection bias 
(Strazzera, 2003).  
 
Second, people may refuse to make trade-offs even if they express values for 
e.g. an environmental good. Respondents expressing values but refusing to pay 
                                                                                                                                      
later as a necessary assumption for “normal preferences” but instead assume that preferences are 
instantaneous and may change over time. How fast and how much the preferences do change is of 
course an important question but the theory do not require such an assumption. The usefulness of 
empirical results, e.g. from SP surveys, is however heavily dependent on the stability of preferences. It 
can be noted that most markets are continuously updated to changes in preferences whereas policies 
based on SP-estimates do normally not have any link to changes in preferences.   4
has been reported by e.g. Stevens et al. (1991), Spash and Hanley (1995), 
Lockwood (1998) and Spash (2000). 
 
Third, there are cases where people report inconsistent rankings. It has been 
found that the ranking of alternatives tend to alter if, on the one hand, WTP or, on 
the other hand, some other attitude measure is used (Brown, 1984; Gregory et al., 
1993; Johansson-Stenman, 2002).  
 
A fourth kind of “anomaly” is when people oppose an economic interpretation 
of their own WTP/WTA answers. The possibility to interpret respondents’ 
answers as expressions of “normal preferences” has been questioned by e.g. 
Vadnjal and O'Connor (1994), Satterfield (2001), Svedsäter (2003), and Vatn 
(2004).  
 
2.2  Anomalies - previous explanations 
The four kinds of “anomalies” above have all been explained as different kind of 
exceptions from standard economic theory. Some attempts have been made to and 
explain why people do protest in SP-surveys. Jorgensen and Syme (2000) suggest 
several reasons for people not to accept to pay; strategic reasons, financial 
constraints, lack of information and negative attitudes toward paying. The negative 
attitudes are divided into six kind of protests where the respondent stresses that: i) 
it is unfair that she should pay, ii) existing tax-revenue should be used, iii) less 
governmental money should be wasted, iv) she should not pay for what is already 
her right, v) money would be wasted if collected and vi) she already pays enough. 
Number ii) was the most frequent in the empirical study reported s.  
 
In a survey by Söderqvist (1998) respondents were asked to motivate the 
reasons for their answers to the WTP-question. Among those who not accepted to 
pay for the project 17 % considered that “the (most) guilty ones should pay” and 
10 % stated that the project should be financed by taxes they already had paid. In a 
study by Stevens et al. (1991) it was found that 25 % refused to pay for “ethical 
reasons”. In a study by Jorgensen et al. (1999) the respondents were, using an 
open-ended question, asked to motivate their refuse to state, or uncertainty about, 
their WTP. The most frequent motivations were “I pay enough already”, “I can’t 
afford to pay at the moment” and “should use existing money”. Jorgensen and 
Syme (2000) conclude that attitudes toward paying were common and related to 
WTP and that protests can occur since people mean that they “are entitled to the 
public good” or that “some other party is responsible for paying”. Also Diamond 
and Hausman (1994) conclude that people may state a “protest zero” if they feel 
that someone else is responsible. Others have concluded that protests are more 
frequent when analysing goods that have been provided for free and that frequent 
visitors more often protest against having to pay (Strazzera, 2003).  
 
Others has suggested that people protest since they believe that they should have 
been asked to answer the questions about environmental projects in a role as 
citizens rather than as consumers (Blamey et al., 1995; Hanley & Milne, 1996; 
Sagoff, 1988), that environmental goods cannot be treated as commodities (Vatn,   5 
2000), or that nature or environmental amenities, per se, cannot be valued in 
monetary terms (Clark et al., 2000).  
 
The explanations above entail, more or less, new unique assumptions for each 
exception. In contrast to such “ad hoc” explanations, some attempts have been 
made to incorporate the explanations to refusals to make trade-offs, the second 
“anomaly”, into a more coherent theoretical framework. If preferences are 
interpreted as expressions for the preparedness to accept trade-offs between 
different amenities, people refusing to make trade-offs may therefore protest 
against SP-scenarios constructed to measure such preferences. This refusal has 
been explained by the occurrence of non-compensatory preferences (e.g. 
Lockwood, 1996a), lexicographic preferences (Spash & Hanley, 1995; Spash, 
2000; Vatn, 2004) or modified lexicographic preferences (MLP) (Spash, 2000).  
 
Lockwood (1996a; 1996b; 1998) has suggested that even if people can make a 
choice between alternatives this does not means that they hold the kind of 
preferences normally assumed in economic theory. Due to non-compensatory 
strong comparability a person can make a choice and say which alternative that is 
better than the other. From such “N-preferences” a value ranking can be made but 
no trade-offs are accepted
3. N-preferences cannot be measured by CVM but they 
may be common, especially for reduction in environmental quality. The presence 
of such preferences may therefore explain results were people refuse to answer or 
where the results seem to contradict the normal assumptions about preferences.  
 
Lexicographic preferences describe the case where the individual refuses to 
make any trade-offs to compensate a loss of a particular commodity. Using the 
welfare economic measures, WTP would be equal to the entire budget and WTA 
would be infinite. Figure 1 illustrates the preferences of a person with 
lexicographic preferences for W (e.g. wildlife). Assuming $ representing all other 
goods providing utility and W having priority over all these other goods there are 
just "indifference points", e.g. A, B and C, and no indifference curves Starting in 
point A, there is no increase in $ enough to compensate a loss in W. Since W has 
priority over $, all points in the shaded area (including the line segment AB, but 
excluding segment AC) are preferred to A. I.e., there is no point producing the 
same utility level as A and no traditional indifference curve exists. The 
implications of lexicographic preferences is that one good ($) will have no priority 
at all which means that point C is preferred to all points to the left of the line BC. 
In the example by Spash and Hanley this means that all other consumption will be 
sacrificed to keep the wildlife at the level of the line BAC
4. 
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Figure 1.  Lexicographic preferences, after Spash and Hanley (1995).  
 
In an empirical study by Spash and Hanley (1995) the respondents who stated 
that “animals/ecosystems/plants should be protected irrespective of the costs”
5 
and, at the same time, refused to give a WTP amount were classified as having 
lexicographic preferences . The result indicated that 23 % of the general public 
had lexicographic preferences. Hanley and Milne (1996) discuss the ethical beliefs 
of respondents and conclude that lexicographic or rights-based ethical beliefs are 
common (99 % of the sample advocated that wildlife and landscape have rights, a 
number that decreased to 19 % if the maintenance of those rights meant a 25 % 
loss in income). They also stress that such rights-based beliefs are distinguished 
from the utilitarian based preferences that is necessary for adoption of the 
Kaldor/Hicks criterion in CBA
6. 
 
The existence of lexicographic preferences has been regarded as unrealistic 
(Malinvaud, 1972, p. 20, referred in; Spash & Hanley, 1995) and instead the con-
cept of modified lexicographic preferences (MLP), where the superiority of one 
amenity is restricted, has been suggested (Spash, 2000). Assuming MLP the WTP 
does not have to be the total budget but may be restricted so that e.g. a minimum 
standard of living is maintained. Spash distinguish between strong and weak MLP 
where the former persist in defending animal rights and the later give up the 
defence when personal living standard would be reduced to a minimum. In the 
study by Spash (2000), those maintaining a rights-based view on animal rights, 
37 % of the population, were classified as having MLP.  
 
The third kind of “anomaly” is the occurrence of preference reversals. People 
who, in a choice situation, chose an environmental improvement turned out to 
have a higher WTP for a private good (Brown, 1984; Gregory et al., 1993; 
Johansson-Stenman, 2002). A preference reversal occurs when there is an 
inconsistence between choice and ranking of buying or selling prices (Shogren, 
2002). One example of this is when most people in a choice situation chose 
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improved air quality ahead of improved computer equipment most people did have 
a higher WTP for the computer improvement (Gregory et al., 1993, referred in; 
Johansson-Stenman, 2002).  
 
The fourth kind of “anomaly” is that people oppose the economic interpretation 
of their own WTP/WTA-answers. In a study by Vadnjal and O'Connor (1994) 
respondents were asked about if they believed that their WTP did measure the 
value of the view investigated. Those who did not think so where asked to explain 
why they did not think that their stated WTP was an accurate measure of the value. 
The conclusion from the answers was that 63% of the respondents stated verbal 
interpretations at odds with the interpretation of values in welfare economics and 
CVM. Vadnjal and O'Connor conclude that the respondents "… responded  in 
terms of a view how things ought to be in society, not from the standpoint of a 
merely self-interested consumer. This was made clear in two main ways: the 
widely expressed view that one 'shouldn't have to pay', and the sentiment also 
widespread that payment signified a willingness to 'fight to keep it'" (Vadnjal & 
O'Connor, 1994, pp 377-78). The respondents were also asked if something could 
compensate the loss suggested and the answer was that nothing could compensate. 
Similar results is reported by (Clark et al., 2000) where an interview with 
qualitative follow-up questions indicated that most respondents did not perceive 
their own WTP-answers as legitimate reflections of environmental values. 
Moreover, it was consensus about that monetary value was not a proper measure 
for the right of nature. Hence, it is questionable if WTP/WTA-expressions always 
can be interpreted as values for e.g. environmental amenities. 
 
 
 
3. Incompatibility between asserted and implied 
rights  
This section offers a common explanation to the different “anomalies” by 
assuming that people may have opinions about initial distribution of rights and that 
these opinions belongs to another category of value expressions than preferences. 
So far, a number of different and disparate explanations have been suggested to 
explain the variety of anomalies, i.e. “strange” reactions and answers to SP-
surveys. First, people seem to protest or refuse to answer because they do not like 
the scenario. Even though this explanation, in one sense, is correct it suffers from 
the lack of connection to the theory of preferences. Second, anomalies are explain-
ed by the presence of non-compensatory preferences (e.g. lexicographic or MLP) 
or preference reversals. The later constitute exceptions from the assumptions about 
“normal preferences” but it is unclear why, and for what amenities, people hold 
non-compensatory preferences. Other explanations to “anomalies”, such as 
“ethical reasons”, that choices are made in the role as citizens or that 
environmental amenities (per se) cannot be valued in monetary terms remain both 
vague and unrelated to economic theory. In this section a framework for   8
classifying value expressions into two categories is suggested. This framework 
offers a common understanding of the “anomalies”.  
 
The “anomalies” above appears as anomalies from the economic perspective, 
i.e. when interpreted from the assumption that all values are expressed as “normal 
preferences”. They are not, however, “anomalies” per se. From other assumptions 
there might be logical and consistent explanations. However, suggesting new 
unique assumptions, i.e. ad hoc assumptions, for each exception mean that 
economic theory will lose in simplicity and generality. The suggested framework, 
that possibly will offer a common understanding of the “anomalies” starts from a 
general assumption
7: 
 
Assumption 1.  People may have opinions about how initial rights should be 
distributed.  
 
The hypothesis underlying this assumption is that many “anomalies” will come 
out as reasonable and rational value-expressions if interpreted as such opinions 
instead of as expressions of preferences. A direct justification of assumption 1 is 
people’s explicit expressions about who should, and shouldn't, pay. As the review 
above shows, people do express opinions as “I should not pay” or that “it is 
someone else’s responsibility”. Such opinions are hard to interpret as ordinary 
preferences but are easily understood as opinions about how initial rights should 
be distributed.  
 
In the following, two complementary assumptions are suggested and it will be 
shown that the three assumptions, jointly, offer a general explanation to the diffe-
rent anomalies. The introduction of new assumptions raises, however, another 
important question. Do they affect the interpretation of results from other 
economic analyses than SP-surveys, such as the analyses of market behaviour? A 
brief discussion on that subject is introduced in sub-section 3.2. 
 
3.1  A general explanation to different anomalies 
To use assumption 1 to explain anomalies in SP-surveys we must explain two 
things. First, why do people choose to express these opinions and not preferences? 
Second, why cannot such opinions be interpreted and analysed as (normal) 
preferences, i.e. what is the difference between the two kinds of value 
expressions?  
 
To answer the first question, recall that in economics it is normally assumed that 
preferences are expressed by actual choices (revealed preferences) or expressed by 
answers to SP-questions (stated preferences). In both cases people are confronted 
with some kind of choice, real or hypothetical, which more or less forces them to 
choose. By the assumption that people are rational it can be concluded that real 
choices do reflect preferences. I.e. we make the interpretation that choices are 
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guided by what we call preferences. To make a choice the alternatives must be 
reasonable clear regarding the distribution of property rights, i.e. if you have to 
pay to get what you want or if you can have what you want for free and even can 
require compensation to give it up. This leads us to a second, supporting, 
assumption that will be used in the analysis
8:  
 
Assumption 2.  Acceptance of property rights is a necessary precondition for 
preference formation.  
 
The general idea that people have complete preferences has been questioned by 
e.g. Diamond and Hausman (1994), Gregory and Slovic (1997), Schkade and 
Payne (1994) and Vatn (2004). If preferences are not complete it must be that, if 
we at all believe that preferences exist, some preconditions have to be fulfilled 
before they are formed. Vatn (2004) has, for example, suggested that the creation 
of preferences requires a social process, i.e. that individuals have to discuss with 
others before they can form their preferences
9. I will not go deeper into the 
discussion about which the other preconditions may be but merely assume that the 
acceptance of rights is one, possibly among others, precondition. Assumption 2 
implies that WTP or WTA only can be expressed if the property rights, as they are 
perceived and understood by the individual, are accepted. Then, what is required 
to accept property rights? A third assumption suggests under what circumstances 
property rights can be accepted.  
 
Assumption 3.  Property rights may be accepted only if they i) cannot be affec-
ted or ii) in case they can be affected if they are regarded as 
morally legitimate.  
 
Hence, in a situation where property rights cannot be affected they may be 
accepted even if they are perceived at morally illegitimate. However, in a situation 
where they can be affected, as perceived by the individual, moral legitimacy is a 
necessary precondition for acceptance of rights.  
 
For amenities valued through SP-surveys the property rights are often more or 
less unclear. The fact that an amenity is not owned in a way that allow for market-
like transactions is, in fact, often the very reason for that a SP-valuation is done. 
As it often is non-rival and non-exclusive amenities being valued people are 
possibly used to having the opportunity to consume e.g. environmental goods for 
free. Hence, it should not be surprising if people believe that they have a right to 
consume the amenity for free also in the future (Strazzera, 2003). This should be 
compared to the usual practice, as recommended by the NOAA-panel (Arrow et 
al., 1993), to use the WTP-format. Since the WTP-format does imply that the 
respondent does not have the right these implied rights may not be accepted since 
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9 The respect for co-owners can be interpreted as an opinion about initial rights. However, the need for 
social interaction can be interpreted as another precondition for preference formation.    10
they are regarded as illegitimate. Moreover, answering a SP-survey may be 
interpreted as a situation where property rights can be affected. Hence, when it 
comes to environmental valuation it is not uncommon that none of the reasons for 
accepting rights are fulfilled. Since answering a SP-survey is an opportunity to 
express opinions about rights at the same time as the legal property rights often are 
unclear means that we should not be surprised if at least some respondents try to 
express their opinions about the initial distribution.  
 
People might be prepared to express preferences even if rights are unclear. This 
can be interpreted as if these persons are prepared to accept the right structure 
implied in a SP-study and therefore also form and express their preferences. Either 
they do find the implied rights morally legitimate or they accept that a SP-survey 
is not the arena for non-preference value-expressions and choose to answer a WTP 
(or WTA) question conditionally to the implied structure of rights. Nevertheless, 
the aim of this paper is to explain why some respondents protest or give “” 
answers that seems to be anomalies to SP-surveys.  
 
To sum up: SP-surveys may constitute an opportunity to express opinions about 
initial distribution of rights and, since people in many cases also may have moral 
doubts about the implied rights, such opinions may be expressed instead of the 
(possibly non-formed) preferences. Then, to turn to the second question 
formulated in this sub-section, why can such value expressions not be interpreted 
as preferences? 
 
The rational for why opinions about how rights should be distributed cannot be 
interpreted as preferences is found in normative economics. There is a link 
between the value premise in normative economics and the interpretation of 
peoples’ value expressions. If all that counts in a normative analysis is preferences 
it is reasonable to interpret as much as possible of people’s value-expressions as 
preferences. Moreover, what cannot be interpreted as preferences is disregarded. 
However, deliberation between preferences, or rather between WTP and WTA, is 
not the only normative question in economics. There are two kind of normative 
adjustments related to the economic analysis: the question of initial distribution of 
rights and the question of efficient redistribution of rights.  
 
The central normative question in the welfare economic analysis is the question 
of efficiency, i.e. if any potential Pareto improvements can be done. This 
redistribution of amenities (or rights) has to be done from a reference point, an ini-
tial distribution. I.e. the measure of the intensity of preferences
10 is the second step 
in an analysis of how resources should be used. There are an infinite number of 
Pareto efficient solutions, each corresponding to different initial distributions of 
rights and different sets of institutions and preferences (Randall, 1987). The 
question of a desired use and distribution of resources hence falls apart into two 
questions where the second is about efficiency in the welfare economic sense 
(secondary redistribution) and the first is about how the initial distribution should 
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be defined (Samuels, 1992)
11. On a working market the first question, of initial 
distribution, is already set: it is the present distribution that counts. This does not 
mean that the very concept of Pareto-optimality has anything to do with the status 
quo distribution. However, as soon as the concept is to be operationalized, some 
initial distribution has to be assumed. This is true not only for analysis of markets, 
but also for analyses of policies using cost benefit analysis and SP-survey results. 
Since all prices on the market depend on the set of rights, the results of a CBA, 
and every elicitation of WTP or WTA, will be dependent on the existing structure 
of rights (Schmid, 1995). 
 
Hence, the question of initial rights is treated as a positive assumption in the 
economic analysis. But the question of how initial rights should be distributed (or 
if and how any primary redistribution of rights should be made) is a normative 
question. This normative question is distinguished from the normative economic 
analysis. There is, however, a clear and important relation between the two 
normative questions; what is economic efficient depends on the initial distribution. 
Therefore, the two normative questions are hierarchal related in the sense that the 
question of initial distribution has to be solved before the question of efficiency
12. 
As well the possibility to make an economic analysis as the outcome of the 
analysis depend on the answer to the superior question of initial rights.  
 
How, then, is this discussion about the normative foundation of welfare 
economics related to the question of which value-expressions that cannot be 
interpreted as preferences? Since there are two kinds of normative deliberations 
related to an economic analysis the interpretation of observations should be 
allowed to be classified as belonging to any of these categories. Hence, the 
normative economic analysis, as well as the normative economic theory, depends 
on the answer to a normative question that cannot be made internal to the analysis. 
Therefore, neither people’s opinions on that normative question can be interpreted 
as preferences. Hence, they cannot be used as inputs to an analysis of efficiency.  
 
3.2  Other implications of the assumptions 
Before continuing the analysis about how the assumptions affect the interpretation 
of people’s reactions to SP-surveys it will, in this sub-section, be stressed that the 
suggested assumptions normally will leave the analyses and interpretations of 
markets unaffected. The reasoning behind that conclusion goes as follows. In a 
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political process (Samuels, 1992).  
12 The analysis of efficiency requires, at least, an assumption about the distribution of initial rights. The 
normative question of how rights should be distributed can, on the other hand, be discussed and 
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rights are distributed, value expressions about the initial distribution are not superior but rather 
outplayed. Such value expressions should be put forward in the proper forum that usually is the 
political process.   12
market situation people usually have to accept the property rights weather you like 
the distribution or not. In market situations the property rights structure is often 
quite clear; the consumer knows that she/he has to pay for most goods and the 
resource owner knows that she/he can get paid for selling e.g. her/his labour. 
People may of course have opinions about the property rights underlying a certain 
market transaction but for market goods an acceptance may have established just 
by prescription
13. But, even if the underlying rights are not regarded as morally 
legitimate a market situation does not constitute a natural arena for expressions of 
values about how rights should be distributed
14, they cannot normally be affected 
that way. Hence, even if the assumptions we have made are general they seem to 
affect the analysis of SP-answers but, principally, leave the analyses of markets 
unaffected. In real experiments with private goods the situation is close to an 
ordinary market situation. That means that anomalies, according to the framework 
suggested here, should be less common. This is also the general findings in 
experiments (Braga & Starmer, 2005).  
 
3.3  Possible right structures – classification and interpretation  
A right implies the possibility to derive utility from the use (or passive use) of an 
amenity and the possibility to refuse to give up this possibility without sufficient
15 
compensation
16. In a SP-survey there is usually a scenario where the respondent is 
asked either to pay for an improvement (or to avoid a deterioration) or to accept 
compensation to forgo an improvement (or to tolerate a deterioration)
17. A 
scenario hence implies a (hypothetical) buyer and seller where the seller has the 
right to the amenity. At the same time, as discussed above, the respondent may 
have ideas about who is the (legitimate) owner and/or who should be the 
(legitimate and/or morally defensible) owner. If the right implied by the scenario, 
the “implied right”, and the right the respondent support, the “asserted right”, do 
not correspond we have a situation with irreconcilable views that may make it 
more reasonable for a respondent to express her/his opinions about how the right 
should be distributed than to answer the intended WTP- or WTA-question
18.  
 
In principle, respondents may assert five different perspectives of how rights 
are, or should be, distributed in relation to herself, to the other party and to “third 
                                                           
13 Such acceptance is at least often more likely in a market situation than for the situation with a 
relatively newly observed scarcity of an environmental good.  
14 There are of course people protesting by e.g. boycotting certain products but the arena for primary 
redistribution of rights is normally the political process (i.e. because of free-riding incentives).  
15 It is also the privilege of the owner to decide what is a sufficient compensation. The problem of 
measuring WTA because of e.g. strategic bias is not a question to be discussed in this paper.  
16 See for example (Schmid, 1995; Bromley, 1995; Bromley, 1997; Hahn et al., 1998) for a more 
complete discussion of the meaning of “rights”.  
17 Which is the correct measure is normally assumed to depend on legal rights but is has also been 
argued that it is the reference state, as people regards it, that should guide the choice of measure 
(Knetsch, 2005). The question here is not about which measure that is correct but about how 
irreconcilable views may affect reactions to surveys.  
18 The situation where respondents state that they “don’t think that they should have to pay” has of 
course been noticed in the literature. The contribution by this paper is to offer an explanation from a 
coherent view on values and value-expressions.    13 
persons”. The “other party” is the one implied to be the seller in the WTP-case and 
the buyer in the WTA-case. Right may be either private or collective. In the 
following, the distribution of rights the respondent believes should be in force is 
called the asserted rights. The classification below should be seen as a framework 
for interpretation of different value-expressions. Just as most of people’s value-
expressions are interpreted as preferences the classification below suggests that 
some value-expressions can be interpreted as opinions about distribution of initial 
rights. Hence, people advocating a non –anthropocentric position, i.e. a position 
that in a sense is incompatible with the anthropocentric perspective of normative 
economics, can be interpreted in terms of expressing an opinion about rights, 
which is compatible with the economic perspective. Such an interpretation makes, 
in principle, such opinions understandable from an economic perspective but it 
also makes it clear in what sense SP-surveys may be problematic for people with 
such opinions. Hence, respondents may assert five types of rights distribution:  
 
I)  The individual may assert a private right of her own to the amenity
19 in 
question. This may be in opposition to legal rights but the important thing for 
the possible creation and expression of preferences is what the respondent 
asserts.  
II)  The individual may assert a collective right including her.  
III)  The individual may assert a private right of the other party.  
IV)  The individual may assert a collective right including the other party 
(excluding herself).  
V)  The individual may assert a private or collective right of someone else than 
the other party or herself. The third party might be another individual or a 
collective living now, i.e. an owner that in principle can take part in a trade-
off by insisting on a certain compensation to accept giving up the right. The 
asserted owner might also be a one impossible to communicate with, e.g. 
other species and/or future generations. 
 
In SP-survey etc. it is, on the other hand implied that the respondent either is the 
owner (WTA-question) or not is the owner (WTP-question). Hence, there are ten 
possible combinations of asserted rights (table 1) and implied rights (owner – not 
owner). The relationship between the implied right and the asserted right might be 
either concordance or incompatibility. In the later case the respondent may find 
the implied rights (morally) illegitimate. If the situation is perceived as a situation 
where rights can be affected the respondent may have problems to form and/or to 
express preferences and may instead protest in some way
20.  
 
                                                           
19 The “amenity” may be e.g. improved or preserved environmental quality. 
20 However, even if this is true for some of the respondent many (perhaps even a majority) of the 
respondents initially disagreeing on the implied rights may i) accept it, ii) form new preferences related 
to the implied rights and iii) state a WTP or WTA that can be interpreted as an expression of 
preferences.   14
Table 1.  Possible combinations of asserted and implied rights.  
  Respondent asserts that 
she has the right 
Respondent asserts that 
other party has the right 
  Privately Collectively Privately Collectively 
Respondent 
asserts that “third 
party” has private 
or collective right 
WTP-
quest.  IWTP IIWTP IIIWTP IVWTP V WTP 
WTA-
quest.  IWTA IIWTA IIIWTA IVWTA IVWTA 
 
In the following sections possible outcomes of the ten possible combinations of 
implied and asserted rights are discussed. Instead of discussing incentives to over- 
or understate once true WTA or WTP respectively the discussion will take its 
starting point in the above assumptions. The question is if it in different situations 
is rational (or at least reasonable) to not express any preferences at all but instead 
e.g. refuse to answer or express something that should be interpreted as opinions 
about rights.  
 
3.4  The WTP-question and different asserted rights  
A WTP-question implies that the respondent do not have the right (either to a 
suggested improvement or to be spared from a suggested deterioration). Under 
which asserted rights is it reasonable to accept the implied right and hence, under 
the suggested assumptions, form and express preferences?  
 
First, the respondent asserting a private or collective right of herself (i.e. type 
IWTP or IIWTP) have good reasons not to accept the suggested scenario where she is 
asked to pay for what is already regarded as her right. Since the respondent asserts 
that she/he has the right our assumptions lead to the conclusion that since there is 
contradictory opinions about who should have the initial rights no preferences will 
be expressed (or even constructed). Answering the WTP-question may be thought 
of as accepting and legitimising the implied right. For the one who believes that 
her asserted rights still, even after possible information in the survey, are desirable 
it is not rational to answer, indirectly, that it shouldn’t.  
 
Second, if the respondent asserts that the implied seller has a private right (i.e. 
type IIIWTP) the implication of the WTP-question is in concordance with the rights 
asserted by the respondent. However, if the amenity, as often is the case, is a non-
rival and nonexclusive amenity the respondent is probably one in an implied 
group/collective of buyers. It may therefore be that the respondent would have 
liked to discuss with the other potential buyers before the preferences are created 
(as suggested by e.g. Clark et al., 2000; Svedsäter, 2003; Vatn, 2004)
21 or at least 
                                                           
21 This reported need for social interaction may, at least for some people, be another precondition for 
preference formation. In this paper we are, however, concentrated on the importance of clarified initial 
distribution.    15 
before any WTP is stated. In most CVM-scenarios the rule of delivery is made 
explicit. Hence, the rights and the institutional settings are probably sufficiently 
well defined to not be an obstacle to create and express preferences. The WTP-
question seems to be compatible with the assumed assertion of the respondent.  
 
Finally, the respondent may assert that someone else than the seller has the right, 
privately or collectively (i.e. type IVWTP or VWTP) 
22. The WTP-question implies 
that the respondent does not have the right, which is in concordance with the 
assertion of the respondent. However, if the scenario implies a payment to 
someone without (asserted) rights to the amenity it may be regarded as (morally) 
illegitimate anyway since it indicates that e.g. an exploiter has the right to 
deteriorate e.g. an environmental good or to get compensation not to do so. The 
respondent that does not hold any superior values for the protection of other’s 
rights might be prepared to also accept the scenario where the implied seller has 
the power to deliver (independent of the rights of other owners). That respondent 
may form and express preferences as expected. In other cases the incompatibility 
between asserted and implied rights may hinder the formation and articulation of 
WTP as an expression of preferences.  
 
To summarize the WTP- cases; it is only when the respondent asserts that the 
implied seller has and should have a private right that there is complete 
concordance between asserted and implied rights. Then, since rights are accepted, 
preferences can be formed and expressed; no anomaly will appear because of 
dissentient views on rights.  
 
In the cases with incompatibility between asserted and implied rights the 
respondent will not accept the implied rights and no preferences will be expressed 
in terms of WTP. The respondent may, however, express opinions about how 
rights should be distributed. Such expression may, if interpreted as representations 
of preferences, appear as anomalies.  
 
3.5  The WTA -question and different asserted rights  
A WTA-question implies that the respondent do have the right (either to a 
suggested improvement or to be spared from a suggested deterioration). Under 
which asserted rights is it reasonable to accept the implied right and hence, under 
the suggested assumptions, form and express preferences? 
 
First, if the respondent asserts a private right of her own (i.e. type IWTA) this is in 
concordance with the implied right. Hence, the implied rights can be accepted and 
WTA can be expressed and interpreted as an expression of preferences
23.  
 
                                                           
22 This includes both the case where the suggested seller is a part of the collective owners and where 
she/he is not. The important property is that there is at least one owner that does not get compensation.  
23 It can be noticed that anomalies appears also in WTA-experiments with private goods where property 
rights is clear. Such anomalies cannot reasonable be explained by dissentient views on rights. The 
framework suggested here does not, however, totally exclude other reasons for anomalies.    16
Second, the respondent may assert a collective right including her (i.e. type 
IIWTA). This is probably a more common situation when SP-studies are conducted 
for non-rival and/or non-exclusive goods that can be used simultaneous by many 
users. If the scenario is clear and if it is clear that also other asserted owners rights 
are respected the implied and asserted rights are in concordance the respondent 
can accept the implied rights and express a WTA that, correctly, can be interpreted 
as representing her preferences. However, the case may be more complicated than 
the case with an asserted private right. The respondent is asked to sell something 
that she/he believes belongs to a collective where a legitimate transfer of rights 
requires that the collective of owners agree on selling
24. If the scenario does not 
respects all owners the respondent may not feel that the individuals that should be, 
really will be compensated. In that case the asserted and implied rights are 
incompatible which may encourage the respondent to express her opinion about 
how the initial rights should be distributed. A special case of this situation is when 
future generations and/or other species are among those asserted as having rights. 
Since these owners cannot give their explicit permissions to give up their rights 
the respondent is put in a situation where she may feel responsible for protecting 
these rights. If so, even the respondent that would be willing to give up her “part” 
of the amenity may refuse to state a WTA since that may be taken for a 
justification of the violation of others rights
25.  
 
Third, the respondent may assert a private right of the implied buyer (i.e. case 
IIIWTA). The WTA-question implies that the respondent has a right, which is 
contradictory to the asserted right and the respondent may not express any WTA. 
Due to the information in the survey, possibly even the WTA-question itself is 
enough, the respondent may of course change her opinion about how the right 
should be distributed. If the respondent believes that the SP-study is conducted by, 
or at the request of, the implied buyer it may be quite easy to accept that the 
asserted owner surrenders her/his right in favour of the respondent. If so, the 
initial incomparability between asserted and implied rights will vanish, and the 
respondent can express a WTA reflecting her preferences.  
 
Fourth, the respondent may assert a collective right including the implied buyer 
(case IVWTA). As in the third case, the WTA-question implies that the respondent 
has a right, which is contradictory to the asserted right. Again, the respondent may 
of course change her opinion. But, in this case the respondent may not, as easy as 
in case IIIWTA, accept that the implied buyer also gives up the rights of the other 
asserted owners. Hence, this case may be equal to case II above where the 
respondent may hesitate to sell others rights.  
 
                                                           
24 The decision rule for the collective may require e.g. majority or consensus. The important property is 
however that acceptance of others than the respondent is required.  
25 Respondents with such opinions about rights may, even if they believe that they should not have to 
pay, be more prepared to state a WTP than a WTA. If the respondent regards the question as a question 
about initial rights a WTP may be understood as a defence for someone's rights (as suggested by 
Vadnjal & O'Connor, 1994) whereas a WTA may be understood as a, perhaps morally illegitimate, 
selling of someone else’s rights.    17 
Finally, the respondent may assert that a third party has a private or collective 
right (case VWTA). As before, the WTA-question implies that the respondent has a 
right, which is contradictory to the asserted right. This case has the same 
implications as discussed above for case IIWTA and IVWTA; respondents may refuse 
to sell someone else’s rights. And, since the implied owner is not among the 
asserted owners, the respondent may not change her opinion as easy as in case 
IIIWTA.  
 
To summarize the WTA-cases; it is only in the case where the respondent 
asserts that she/he has and should have a private right that there is immediate 
concordance between asserted and implied rights. In the case were the respondent 
asserts that the implied buyer has the right it is probably easy to accept that the 
right is given up in favour of oneself. If implied rights are accepted preferences 
may be formed and a preference-reflecting WTA expressed. In the other cases it is 
a question of if the respondent is prepared to defend the rights of others when it so 
directly entails that the respondent forgo an offer. It seems quite reasonable that a 
respondent will hesitate to state a WTA when a “third party” is among the owners 
since this implies selling something that belongs to others. This problem becomes 
more obvious considering goods/commodities where it is assumed that also future 
generations have rights. If a respondent believes that future generations have the 
right to e.g. biodiversity, expressed for example as a right to the maintenance of 
the species living in an area today, it may be problematic for her/him to agree on 
selling her/his part of that right. The same kind of problem will occur with other 
asserted right-holders that are impossible to communicate with, such as other 
species.  
 
 
4. Incompatible opinions about rights and 
anomalies: examples from the literature 
The analysis in previous section is summarized in table 2. Only in two cases there 
is perfect concordance between asserted and implied rights. In the other cases 
there are good reasons for not expressing preferences and the respondents may 
protest or report WTP/WTA-measures that should not be interpreted as reflections 
of normal preferences but as an opinion about how initial rights should be 
distributed. Some of these answers may appear as anomalies. Others may not, in 
e.g. magnitude, diverge from what could be expected as reasonable expressions of 
preferences. To interpret these as reflections of preferences is nevertheless an 
incorrect interpretation.  
   18
Table 2.  Relations between asserted and implied rights. INC (incompatibility) means that 
respondents may have problems to form preferences and CON (concordance) means that 
preferences may be formed.  
  Respondent asserts that 
she has the right 
Respondent asserts that 
other party has the right 
  Privately Collectively Privately Collectively 
Respondent 
asserts that “third 
party” has private 
or collective right 
WTP-
quest. 
(IWTP) 
INC 
(IIWTP) 
INC 
(IIIWTP) 
CON 
(IVWTP) 
INC 
(VWTP) 
INC 
WTA-
quest. 
(IWTA) 
CON 
(IIWTA) 
INC 
(IIIWTA)
INC / 
CON 
(IVWTA) 
INC 
(IVWTA) 
INC 
 
In this section some previous results, reported in the literature, are discussed in 
relation to the framework suggested above. The survey is by no means complete 
and should, first and foremost, be regarded as exemplifying how the framework 
can be used to understand some anomalies.  
 
The survey by Spash and Hanley (1995) can be used as an example of cases 
IIWTP and/or VWTP. The people advocating that e.g. other species have rights and 
stating a WTP equal to zero should be interpreted as refusing to answer a 
secondary redistribution question before the initial distribution question was 
clarified. A possible position among these respondents is that e.g. ecosystems have 
rights but that it is not up to the respondent to pay for defend these rights and that 
exploiters do not have the right to compensation. The respondents with WTP = 0 
were asked to motivate this and could chose the alternative that “biodiversity 
should be protected by law, and we shouldn’t have to pay money to protect it”, an 
obvious motivation for the one with the suggested perspective of rights. In total, 
31 out of 65 chose that alternative while in the ecosystem sub-sample the rate was 
17 out of 19 (Spash & Hanley, 1995, table 6, p. 202). It should be noted that 
respondent only were allowed to choose one of the alternatives so the “protect by 
law” alternative might have had some influence also for the rest of the 
respondents. The respondents stating that “animals/ecosystems/plants should be 
protected irrespective of the costs” but who stated a positive WTP constitutes a 
problem for Spash and Hanley since they “have indicated that a decrease in bio-
diversity should be avoided” but at the same time have a too low WTP to be 
consistent. Note that these respondents did not have the option to stress that they 
“shouldn’t have to pay money to protect it”. Hence, those respondents may also 
advocate that they shouldn’t have to pay but chose to express preferences 
conditional to a situation they oppose. Such views are understandable if 
interpreted as non-preferential value-expressions but not as lexicographic 
preferences.  
 
In the study by Spash (2000) 37 % were interpreted as holding MLP. From the 
perspective advocated here respondents have good reasons to regard the WTP-
question as illegitimate since they seem to endorse that “third party” have rights 
(i.e. case IIWTP and/or VWTP.) and therefore refuse to state a positive WTP-bid.   19 
However, 15% of the total population gave positive WTP-bids even if they 
advocated an animal rights based position. If such answer is interpreted as an 
opinion about how rights should be distributed, and not as a reflection of 
preferences, there is no logical inconsistence in such answers.  
 
The same kind of interpretation can be made of the results reported by 
Lockwood (1998). Moreover, the procedure suggested by Lockwood where 
different kind of value-expressions are integrated is problematic since value-
expressions that are incomparable, because of their hierarchical relation, are mixed 
together. The hierarchal relation between values of different kind means that the 
question of rights should be solved prior to the question of efficiency and not 
simultaneously.  
 
The results referred by Johansson-Stenman (2002) were interpreted as indication 
of preference reversals. The perspective of value-expressions suggested here 
offers another explanation. Many people may have regarded that they had the right 
to clean air quite making that question to an example of case IIWTP where 
incompatibility can explain anomalies. On the other hand, few should claim that 
they have the right to improved computer equipment, making that WTP-question 
to an example of case IIIWTP with perfect concordance between implied and 
asserted rights. Hence, even if you have potentially very strong preferences for 
clean air you may not be in a situation where those preferences can be formed or 
expressed. As Brown (1984), who reported similar results, notice in a footnote 
there were subjects stating either that government should pay or that pollution 
should be strictly controlled. Hence, these results can be interpreted as a result of 
incompatible implied and asserted rights; you may hold a strong value for e.g. air 
quality improvements but you do not believe that you should have to pay for it. 
 
Also the kind of protests reported by e.g. Söderqvist (1998) can be interpreted as 
expressions about how rights are distributed. People claiming that they already 
have paid (taxes) for something are expressing views that fit into case IIWTP. Pay-
ment vehicle bias, such as people protesting against taxes (as 10 % of those who 
didn’t want to pay in the survey reported by Söderqvist did) may be interpreted as 
believing that they have acquired the right by already having paid for it.  
 
Finally, the results and interpretations by Vadnjal and O'Connor (1994) can also 
be interpreted and expressed in terms of incompatibility between implied and 
asserted rights. Hence, when people expressed views of how things ought to be in 
society this can be interpreted as another view of how initial property rights should 
be distributed. As suggested above respondents may refuse to state a WTA as long 
as all the other owners (including future generations and/or non-human right-
holder) have not agreed in selling the property
26. The results can thus be used as 
examples of cases IIWTA, IVWTA and/or VWTA.   
                                                           
26 Vadnjal and O'Connor also conclude that people seem to report a WTP for ones right to participate in 
the political process. I.e. respondents were answering more as citizens, making judgements of what is 
right and wrong, than as consumers. The same conclusion is made by Blamey et al. (1995). Such   20
 
The examples above have shown that results that previously has been regarded 
as anomalies can be explained and understood as results of incomparability 
between implied and asserted rights. This does not mean that other explanations to 
anomalies in all cases have to be substituted. Neither should the conclusion be 
taken to mean that all respondents have to express opinions about rights instead of 
preferences. First, people may, prior to the survey, assert the same rights as 
implied by the question. Second, people may, as a consequence of the information 
in the survey, come to assert the same rights as implied by the question. Finally, 
some people may conditionally assert the implied rights and thereby be prepared 
to express conditional preferences.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
The main conclusion of this paper is that it is possible to interpret and understand 
many anomalies as a result of incompatible implied and asserted rights. Hence, 
results that previous have appeared as anomalies, might be rational responses from 
people expressing opinions about how rights should be distributed. By assuming 
that some value expressions should not be interpreted as normal preferences and 
that acceptance of property rights is a precondition for preference formation it was 
shown that there, in many cases, are good reasons for people to express this kind 
of opinions. Since the question of initial distribution of rights must be solved prior 
to the question of efficiency it is rational to express ones opinions about initial 
rights in a situation where it is both possible and called for. Possible because 
answering a survey can be regarded as an opportunity to express such values and 
called for if the WTP/WTA-question implies a distribution of rights that is 
incompatible with the one asserted by the respondent. The result may be e.g. 
refusals to answer, protests and/or WTP/WTA-responses that, if interpreted as 
preferential expressions, would contradict the normal assumptions about 
preferences. Hence, the assumptions that some value-expressions can be 
interpreted as opinions about how initial rights should be distributed and that 
preferences may not be formed until rights are accepted do offer an alternative 
explanation to several “anomalies” that previously have given rise to a number of 
ad hoc explanations.  
 
The assumptions and explanations suggested here incorporate many previous 
explanations into a coherent framework. Protests can in many cases be understood 
precisely as protests against implied rights. Refusals to make trade-offs can be 
understood as an outcome of answers on a superior level (about distribution of 
rights) instead of as expression of preferences. Hence, the suggested interpretation 
reduces the need for e.g. lexicographic preferences as explanation to some 
anomalies. Also the occurrence of inconsistent rankings can be explained as an 
outcome of incompatibility between implied and asserted rights, which weaken the 
                                                                                                                                      
expressions about the desired initial distribution should not, as made clear here, be mixed with 
preferences over the secondary redistribution.    21 
arguments for irrational behaviour. And finally, the fourth anomaly discussed, 
when people oppose an economic interpretation of their answer also this can be 
interpreted in terms of opinions about how initial rights should be distributed. But 
also other “anomalies” can be understood and interpreted. So can, for example, a 
comment as “I shouldn’t have to pay” fairly direct be interpreted as an opinion that 
the respondent asserts that she already has a right. Moreover, the quite vague 
explanations referring to “ethical motives” will be clearer if they can be expressed 
in terms of opinions about rights. Refusals to value environmental amenities in 
monetary terms may, e.g., be interpreted as a defence for rights (of species, 
ecosystems etc.). The opinion that the value of environmental goods, as such, can-
not be measured in monetary terms, can also be interpreted as protests against the 
implied rights.  
 
One property of the suggested interpretation is that it leaves the economic 
description of the actual preferences unaffected. Once the preferences are formed 
the normal assumptions are valid. This may be regarded as an advantage compared 
to e.g. explanations as the occurrence of lexicographic preferences. Hence, in 
circumstances where property rights are accepted and cannot be affected, value ex-
pressions can still be interpreted as reflecting normal preferences. In a market 
situation the property rights are normally sufficiently accepted and the market is 
probably not regarded as an arena for any claims for secondary redistribution of 
rights.  
 
It should be noted that it, empirically, might be difficult to differentiate between, i) 
answers that are expressions of preferences and ii) answers that are expressions of 
opinions about how initial rights should be distributed. People that intend to 
protest against implied rights may give answers that give the incorrect impression 
of reflecting ordinary preferences. Hence, it may be that more there are 
respondents actually expressing opinions about initial rights than what is indicated 
by the occurrence of anomalies.  
 
The results of the analysis above are important, as discussed above, for how 
results of SP-surveys should be interpreted. Even though it is not an aim of this 
paper, it should be noted that the result of course entail complications for how SP-
surveys should be designed in order to make people form and express preferences. 
Generally, it can be said that surveys should be designed so that people, at least 
conditionally, accept the implied rights. This means that the WTP-question may be 
problematic in cases where people assert that they have the right, e.g. because they 
for long time have had the possibility to, without paying, enjoy a landscape etc. 
Hence, the analysis in this paper offers an argument against the recommendation 
to always use the WTP-format.  
 
Moreover, for amenities with collective rights, as asserted by the respondent, 
both the WTP- and the WTA-question imply rights that may be incompatible with 
the asserted rights. This means that, for many environmental goods, neither the 
WTP- nor the WTA-question may imply rights that can be accepted by the 
respondents. The problem is not, according to the analysis suggested here, that the 
amenities are “environmental” but rather that respondents assert that e.g. future   22
generations or other species have rights that are incompatible with the implied 
rights. This conclusion involves probably even greater problems for SP-methods. 
If a right means that the owner explicitly must agree on selling, and if people 
assert that future generations, that cannot agree explicitly, have rights, then 
respondents may refuse to get involved in any (even hypothetical) exchanges at 
all.  
 
One may argue that information about people’s opinions about how initial rights 
should be distributed is an interesting result rather than a problem. Such 
information may even be regarded as more relevant, for example if a certain policy 
is regarded as an initial distribution (of previously undistributed) rights. In such 
cases it is important to explicitly design the survey to answer the question about 
how initial rights should be distributed. Otherwise, there is a risk to draw the 
incorrect conclusion that all respondents that correctly answer the WTP- or WTA-
question support the implied rights. First, as mentioned above, answers may be 
misinterpreted as reflections of preferences. Second, some people may, when 
answering the survey, form preferences in relation to the rights implied by the 
question. This may be since they, just as intended in a normal SP-survey, don’t 
regard the situation as a situation where the distribution of rights can be affected. 
They may however, if they were confronted with the question, have expressed 
opinions about the distribution of rights at odds with the implied rights.  
 
The last comments may be regarded as an argument for adding an explicit 
question about people’s opinions about the distribution of rights to SP-surveys. An 
additional question can, possibly, derive more information about the values people 
hold. But, does it solve the problem of potential incompatibility between asserted 
and implied rights? One hypothesis is that the possibility to explicitly express 
one’s opinions about initial distribution of rights will make people more prepared 
to, at least conditionally, express also preferences. On the other hand, such an 
explicit question on opinions about initial distribution of rights could just as well 
make more respondents more reluctant to express preferences. How people 
actually would react is an empirical question, and a question for further research.  
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